Korean nationalism

Korean nationalism
Korean name
Hangul	한국민족주의
Hanja	韓國民族主義
Transcriptions Revised Romanization Hanguk minjokjuui McCune–Reischauer Han'guk minjokchuŭi
North Korean name
Chosŏn'gŭl	조선민족주의
Hancha	朝鮮民族主義
Transcriptions Revised Romanization Joseon minjokjuui McCune–Reischauer Chosŏn minjokchuŭi

Korean nationalism refers to nationalism among the Korean people. In the Korean context, this encompasses various of movements throughout history to maintain the Korean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity. Korean nationalism tends to be ethnic and racial in nature, rather than civic.^{[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]}

History

Historically, the central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement during Colonial Korea.^[8] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. The Donghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by the Righteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.

National resistance movements

Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During the colonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting against Imperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China Proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.

Partition of Korea

Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposing ideologies, and global politics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope.

Korean reunification

With regard to Korean nationalism, the reunification of the two Koreas is a highly related issue. Ethnic nationalism that is prevalent in Korean society is likely to play a significant role in the unification process, if it does occur. As Gi-Wook Shin claims, “Ethnic consciousness would not only legitimize the drive for unification but also could be common ground, especially in the early stage of the unification process, that is needed to facilitate a smooth integration of the two systems.”^[9]

Korean reunification (Korean: 남북통일) refers to the hypothetical future reunification of North Korea and South Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted a sunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees from the North migrating into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.

State-aligned nationalism

North Korea

In North Korea, nationalism is incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology of Juche. The Juche Idea (Korean pronunciation: [tɕutɕʰe] approximately "joo-cheh") teaches that "man is the master of everything and decides everything," and that the Korean people are the masters of Korea's revolution. Juche is a component of North Korea's political system. The word literally means "main body" or "subject"; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" and the "spirit of self-reliance".

The Juche Idea gradually emerged as a systematic ideological doctrine in the 1960s. Kim Il-sung outlined the three fundamental principles of Juche as being:

1. "independence in politics" (chaju)
2. "self-sustenance in the economy" (charip)
3. "self-defense in national defense" (chawi).

Unlike in South Korea, North Koreans tend to see the North Korean state and the "Korean race" (Korean: Minjok) as being analogous.^[2][3]

South Korea

While nationalistic theory and practice during the colonial era and the First Republic of South Korea were class-based and movement specific forces, in the South Korea of recent times (1990s onward) a more broad-based (including middle-income classes) sentiment has developed in the national ethos, the so-called "New Nationalism." Two ideologies drive the new nationalism: the old national liberation movement logic of anti-imperialism on the one hand, and a state-worshipping ideology introduced by the Park Jung-Hee regime and embodied in its pledge of National Allegiance (국민교육헌장), on the other hand.

The "New" South Korean nationalism drives public policy and has been a powerful controlling force upon the South Korean polity since 2004. It has had a coercive power to raise national consensus on such divisive issues as the South Korea's participation in the War on Iraq, strengthened gestures for sovereignty in the face of a unilateral military alliance with the United States, modern confrontations with China and Japan over territorial issues, and so forth.

State-based nationalism in South Korea is weak, compared with the more salient racial nationalism.^[2][3] Most South Koreans tend to see the "Korean race" and the South Korean state as being separate subjects, whereas in North Korea, its citizens see the North Korean state and the "Korean race" as being coterminous.^[2][3] As most South Koreans are racial nationalists,^[2][3] they tend to see positive achievements, such as sporting successes, as being a result of inherent racial characteristics, whereas negative events are attributed to the incompetence and inherent inferiority of the state.^[2][3] One of the reasons of South Koreans' lack of support for the South Korean state is due to the popular misconception that only North Korea purged its regime of pro-Japanese collaborators of the colonial period.^[2] According to Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University:

South Korean nationalism is something quite different from the patriotism toward the state that Americans feel. Identification with the Korean race is strong, while that with the Republic of Korea is weak.

— Brian Reynolds Myers, "South Korea's Collective Shrug" (27 May 2010), The New York Times.^[2]

This weak state nationalism was reflected in the former South Korean military oath and former pledge of allegiance, which pledged allegiance to the "Korean race" over the state.^{[4][5][6][3][6][7]}

Particular issues

Anti-Japanese sentiment

The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there. Some Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases as comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers during World War II which is a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-Korea relations since the 1990s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. Recent Japanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical revisionism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes during World War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.

According to Robert E. Kelly, a professor at Pusan National University, anti-Japanese racism in South Korea stems not just from Imperial Japanese atrocities during the colonial era, but from the Korean Peninsula's division.^[6] As most Koreans, north and south are racial nationalists, most South Koreans feel a kinship and racial solidarity with North Korea as a result.^[6] Due to this perceived racial kinship, it is considered bad form for a South Korean to hate North Korea, to run the risk of being called a race traitor.^[6] As a result, Kelly says, South Koreans take out the anger rising from Korean division against Japan.^[6] This view is supported by another professor, Brian Reynolds Myers of Dongseo University.^[2][3]

Liancourt Rocks dispute

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has been ongoing since the end of World War II after the United States rejected Korea's claim to give sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islands, known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, to Korea in the 1951. Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse. Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.

With the introduction of the 1994 UN Law of the Sea Convention, South Korea and Japan began to set their new maritime boundaries, particularly in overlapping terrain in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), where some exclusive economic zone (EEZ) borders was less than 400 nautical miles (700 km) apart.^[10] Tensions escalated in 1996 when both governments declared a 200-nautical-mile (400 km) EEZ that encompassed the island, which brought Japan-South Korean relations to an all-time low.

This has not only complicated bilateral relations but heightened nationalist sentiments on both sides. In spite of generational change and the passage of time, the institutionalization of Korean collective memory is causing young Koreans to be as anti-Japanese, if not more so, than the older generation.^[11] For Koreans, "historical memory and feelings of han (resentment) run deeply and can influence Korea's relations with its neighbors, allies, and enemies in ways not easily predicted by models of policy-making predicated on realpolitik or other geo-strategic or economic concerns."^[12]

Due to Korea’s colonial past, safeguarding the island has become equivalent to safeguarding the nation-state and its national identity. A territory’s value and importance is not limited to its physical dimensions but also the psychological value it holds as a source of sovereignty and identity.^[13] Triggered by strong feelings of injustice and humiliation, Korean nationalistic sentiment has become involved in the dispute. The island itself has become to symbolize Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve.^[14] South Korea’s claim to the island holds emotional content that goes beyond material significance, and giving way on the island issue to Japan would be seen as compromising the sovereignty of the entire peninsula.

The South Korean government has also played a role in fanning nationalism in this dispute. President Roh Moo-hyun began a speech on Korea-Japan relations in April 2006 by bluntly stating, “The island is our land” and “for Koreans, the island is a symbol of the complete recovery of sovereignty.”^[15] The issue of the island is clearly tied to the protection of the nation-state that was once taken away by Japan. President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying:

“Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea’s sovereignty.”^[15]

Later on in his speech Roh also mentions the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history textbook controversy, saying that they will be dealt with together.^[16] Having placed the Liancourt Rocks issue "in the context of rectifying the historical record between Korea and Japan" and "the safeguarding of [Korea's] sovereignty", compromise becomes impossible.^[17] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."^[18]

The Liancourt Rocks dispute has affected the Korean and Japanese perceptions of each other. According to a recent survey by Gallup Korea and the Japan Research Center, 20% of Koreans had friendly feelings towards Japan and 36% of Japanese the same towards Korea. When asked for the reason of their antipathy, most Koreans mentioned the territorial dispute over the island, and the Japanese the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. This is in contrast to a 2002 survey (post 2002 FIFA World Cup) conducted by the Chosun Ilbo and Mainichi Shimbun, where 35% of Koreans and 69% of Japanese had friendly views of the other country.^[19]

Anti-American sentiment

Anti-Americanism in Korea began with the earliest contact between the two nations and continued after the division of Korea. In both North Korea and South Korea, anti-Americanism after the Korean War has focused on the presence and behavior of American military personnel (USFK), aggravated especially by high-profile accidents or crimes by U.S. servicemembers, with various crimes including rape and assault, among others.

The 2002 Yangju highway incident especially ignited Anti-American passions.^[20] The ongoing U.S. military presence in South Korea, especially at the Yongsan Garrison (on a base previously used by the Imperial Japanese Army during Colonial Korea) in central Seoul, remains a contentious issue. While protests have arisen over specific incidents, they are often reflective of deeper historical resentments. Robert Hathaway, director of the Wilson Center's Asia program, suggests: "the growth of anti-American sentiment in both Japan and South Korea must be seen not simply as a response to American policies and actions, but as reflective of deeper domestic trends and developments within these Asian countries."^[21]

Korean anti-Americanism after the war was fueled by American occupation of USFK troops and support for the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, and what was perceived as an American endorsement of the brutal tactics used in the Gwangju massacre.^[22] Speaking to the Wilson Center, Katherine Moon was noted by Hathaway as suggesting that "anti-Americanism also represents the collective venting of accumulated grievances that in many instances have lain hidden for decades", but that despite the "very public demonstrations of anger toward the United States [...] the majority of Koreans of all age groups supports the continuation of the American alliance."^[23]

Ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism emphasizes descent and race. Among some Koreans, ethnicity is interpreted with blood being the key determinant in defining "Koreanness".^[12] A survey conducted around 2006 showed that 68.2% of respondents considered "blood" the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation, and 74.9% agreed that "Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence and ideology."^[12] This viewpoint implies that North Koreans and overseas Koreans are to be included in this "Korean" group.

Importance of blood

The term "pure blood" refers to the notion that Korean people are a pure race descended from a single ancestor. First invoked during the period of resistance to colonial rule, the idea of having pure blood gave Koreans an impetus for developing a sense of ethnic homogeneity and national pride, as well as a potential catalyst for racial discrimination and prejudice.^[24] As a way of resisting colonial rule, Shin Chaeho published his book Joseon Sanggosa in the 1920s, proclaiming that Korean descent is based on the Goguryeo kingdom, formed from the intermingling of the descendants of Dangun Joseon with the Buyeo kingdom. This raised a sense of ethnic homogeneity which persists as a major element in Korea's politics and foreign relations.^[25] A survey in 2006 showed that 68.2% of respondents considered "blood" the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation, and 74.9% agreed that "Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence and ideology."^[12]

Brian Myers argues in his book The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of purest race arose from Japanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan left, Myers argues, the theory was adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean race.^[26]

Nationalist historiography

Shin Chaeho was the first historian to focus on the Korean minjok (or ethnicity), and narrated Korean history in terms of its minjok history. For Shin, minjok and history were mutually defining and as he says in the preface of the Doksa Sillon, “if one dismisses the minjok, there is no history.” Shin emphasized the ancientness of the Korean minjok history, elevated the status of the semi-legendary figure, Dangun, as the primordial ancestor of the Korean people and located the host minjok, Puyo.^[27] Shin launched a vision of the Korean nation as a historically defined minjok or ethnicity entity.^[28] In an attempt to counter China's controversial Northeast Project and Goguryeo controversies that ensued, the South Korean government in 2007 incorporated the founding of Gojoseon of the year 2333 BCE into its textbooks.^[29] In 2006, the South Korean government incorporated the founding of Gojoseon of the year 2333 BCE into its textbooks.^[30]

2002 FIFA World Cup

In a Cinderella story, after five consecutive World Cups without a single win, the South Korean national soccer team made it to the semifinals with an improbable series of triumphs in 2002. The 2002 World Cup, hosted in South Korea and Japan, saw the South Korean team claim victory over such traditional soccer powerhouses as Portugal, Italy, and Spain, before finally succumbing to Germany in the semifinals. As the team continued to advance, their success was heralded by fervent displays of Korean pride; as many as seven million South Korean fans poured out onto the streets to watch the games on outdoor television screens.^[31] The unity among these fans was not simply about soccer; it was also wrapped up in a sense of national pride, identity, and confidence.^[32] After South Korea defeated Spain in the quarterfinals, South Korean President and Nobel Prize winner Kim Dae Jung stated that it was Korea’s happiest day since Dangun, the legendary founder of Korea.^[32] Soccer-inspired nationalism even resulted in tragedy when a man lit himself on fire to become the team’s twelfth man.^[33]

The nationalistic fervor was not confined to the Korean Peninsula, but also extended to South Korean expatriate communities all around the world. On June 11, over 20,000 Korean-Americans filled the Staples Center in Los Angeles, California at 4:30 a.m. to cheer and support their team in unison.^[32] In the words of Kwon Pyonghyon, chairman of the Overseas Koreans Foundation, "One of the most important impacts of the World Cup on the 5.6 million overseas Koreans was to arouse their pride in being [ethnic] Korean and to bond with one another beyond differences."^[32] Indeed, South Korea's success led to a rare conciliatory statement from North Korea. Tensions between the two nations had been high following a recent naval battle which led to the sinking of a South Korean patrol boat, killing four and injuring 19. In spite of these recent events, the chief of North Korea’s Football Association, Ri Gwan Gun, nonetheless sent a congratulatory letter to Chung Mong Joon, the President of South Korea’s Korea Football Association.^[34]

Virginia Tech shooting

Ethnic nationalism is often cited as a reason why the 2007 mass shooting at Virginia Tech elicited a strong response in South Korea as well as from the South Korean expatriate community in the United States. "In Korea, one can argue that nationalism based on common blood and shared ancestry has functioned as a key mechanism to establish collectivism or a strong sense of oneness."^[32] Although the gunman, Seung-Hui Cho, was a 1.5 generation immigrant who came to the U.S. as a third grader and was a permanent resident alien of the U.S., he was still a "Korean" due to his ancestry and thus caused South Koreans to collectively mourn and feel guilt.^[35]

There was an outpouring of grief among South Koreans as they grappled to understand how a "Korean" could have committed such a massacre. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun issued several official apologies and condolences, and candlelight vigils were held at the American embassy in Seoul. A South Korean professor criticized this behavior, saying that South Koreans "need to stop going on about bloodlines and how great the 'Korean race' is while getting so excited with joy or sorrow at the successes and failures of overseas Koreans."^[36]

Greater Korea

The term Greater Korea^[37][38] is a pan-nationalist and irredentist concept towards lands considered to be the national homeland of Koreans by some Koreans. Besides the Korean peninsula, it includes the Gando region, Manchuria and neighboring parts of Russia (Yeonhaeju) where about three million ethnic Koreans live.^[37] The term Korea Proper has sometimes been used in Korean nationalist historiography to refer to the central Manchurian basin and the Korean peninsula.^[39] At times the Tsushima Island (Daemado) is included.

Manchuria and Gando Disputes

Korean nationalist historians have sometimes claimed that Manchuria (Northeast China) as well as Gando, a region bordering China, North Korea, and Russia, should be part of Korea, based on prior Koguryo control of the area.^[40] The claim for Gando (known in China as Jiandao) is said to be stronger than the claim for the whole of Manchuria, due to later Balhae presence in Gando after the fall of the Koguryo kingdom, the current area population's consisting of 1/3 ethnic Koreans,^[41] and the circumstances of the 1909 Gando Convention that relegated the area to Chinese control.^[42] While the Manchurian claims have not received official attention in South Korea, claims for Gando were the subject of a bill introduced in 2004, at a time when China had been claiming that Balhae and Koguryo had been "minority states" within China and the resulting controversy was at its height.^[43] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void".^[44] Later that year, the two countries reached an understanding that their governments would refrain from further involvement in the historical controversy.^[45]

See also

• Sojunghwa (Korean ethnocentrism)
• Hanchongryun
• Korean ethnic nationalism
• Racism in South Korea
• VANK

Bibliography

Journals

• Min Gyo Koo. (Fall 2005). "Economic Dependence and the Dokdo/Takeshima Rocks Dispute Between South Korea and Japan.". Harvard Asia Quarterly. 9 (4). 
• Wang, Jianwei. (2003). Muthiah Alagappa, ed. "Territorial Disputes and Asian Security". Asian Security. Stanford University Press. 
• Schmid, Andre. (February 1997). "Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'ae-ho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea,". The Journal of Asian Studies. 56 (1). 
• Chang Ūl-Byōng (November 1986). "Shin Ch'ae-ho's Nationalism and Anarchism". Korea Journal. 

News

• Office of the President, South Korea (April 25, 2006). "Special Message by President Roh Moo-hyun on Korea-Japan Relations.". 
• Kristof, Nicholas D. (July 12, 1987). "Anti-Americanism Grows in South Korea". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-04-11. 
• "Road deaths ignite Korean anti-Americanism". International Herald Tribune. August 1, 2002. Archived from the original on 2007-06-13. Retrieved 2008-04-11. 
• Kim Tong-hyung (23 Feb 2007), "New Textbook Stirs Debate Over Kojoson", The Korea Times 
• Brodkin, Jon (June 26, 2002). "South Korea's World Cup dream is over, but the party goes on". The Guardian. London. 
• "CNNSI.com - South Korean fan in World Cup suicide". CNN. Reuters. June 14, 2002. 
• "CNNSI.com - North Korea congratulates Seoul on Cup success". CNN. Reuters. July 1, 2002. 
• Kim Sae-jung (April 19, 2007), South Korean's Reaction to the Virginia Tech Massacre. 
• Choe Hyun (April 23, 2007), "Seung-hui Choi and Hines Ward", The Hankyoreh. 
• Dr Andrei Lankov (2006-09-16). "The legacy of long-gone states". Asia Times Online. 

Academic/Educational

• RYU Tongshik (1999) [1983]. "THE HUMANITIES AND NATIONALIDENTITY: The Case of Korea". Kokugakuin University. Retrieved 14 November 2013. 
• The Making of "Anti-American" Sentiment in Korea and Japan, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 6, 2003, retrieved 2007-12-05 
• Gi-Wook Shin, Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University (2 August 2006), Ethnic pride source of prejudice, discrimination 
• Cathy Cockrell (19 February 2010), "North Korea's official propaganda promotes idea of racial purity and moral superiority, scholar says", UC Berkeley News, University of California, Berkeley 
• Berger, Thomas U. (October 28, 2005), Of Shrines and Hooligans: The Structure of the History Problem in East Asia after 9/11., Paper presented at the East Asian Seminar, Boston University.  This can also be found as a chapter in a book called "Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations".
• Larsen, Kirk. (October 6–8, 2006), Visions and Versions of Korean Nationalism and the ROK's Relations with its Neighbors.  - Presented at U.S.-Korea Relations in the 21st Century Challenges and Prospects, Washington, D.C.

Books

• Gi-Wook Shin (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. Stanford University Press. 

References

External links

• Korean history