Xinjiang conflict

Xinjiang conflict
Part of the Cold War and the War on Terror
Xinjiang region in China
Date 1960s – present (56 years) Location Xinjiang, China Status Ongoing
Belligerents
People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army People's Armed Police	ETPRP (1969–1989) URFET (1969–1989) Supported by: Soviet Union (1969–1989) Mongolian People's Republic (1960–1989)	Turkistan Islamic Party ETLO (2000–2003) Supported by: al-Qaeda[1][2] Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan[1] Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[3] Islamic Jihad Union[4] ETESA[5] Grey Wolves[6][7] Hizb ut-Tahrir[8][9][10][11]
Commanders and leaders
Xi Jinping (2012-present) Mao Zedong (1945–1976) Hua Guofeng (1976–1981) Deng Xiaoping (1981–1989) Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) Hu Jintao (2002–2012)	Yusupbek Mukhlisi (1969–1989)	Abdullah Mansour[13] Hasan Mahsum  † Abdul Haq  † Abdul Shakoor al-Turkistani  †
Casualties and losses
~1,000 killed (2007–2015)[14][15][16]

The Xinjiang conflict^[17] is an ongoing^[18] separatist conflict in China's far-west province of Xinjiang, whose northern region is known as Dzungaria and whose southern region (the Tarim Basin) is known as East Turkestan.^[19] Uyghur separatists claim that the region is not a part of China, but that the Second East Turkestan Republic was illegally incorporated into the People's Republic of China in 1949 and has since been under Chinese occupation. The East Turkestan independence movement is led by Turkic Islamist organizations, most notably the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement), against the Chinese government.

Background

The area known as Xinjiang was a protectorate of China as early as 60 BCE (during the Han dynasty, when it was part of the Protectorate of the Western Regions) and during the Tang dynasty (when it was part of the Protectorate General to Pacify the West, although there were a number of periods of independence from China. The area of modern-day Xinjiang consists of the Tarim Basin and Dzungaria, and was inhabited by Indo-European Tocharian and Iranic Saka peoples who practiced Buddhism until the Islamicisation and Turkicisation of Xinjiang. During the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty created the province of Xinjiang.^[20]

Previous uprisings

The Xinjiang Wars were a series of armed conflicts during the early- and mid-20th-century Warlord Era of the Republic of China and the Chinese Civil War, which saw the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The wars played an important role in the East Turkestan independence movement.

After the establishment of the Soviet Union, many Uyghurs who studied in Soviet Central Asia Russified their surnames.^[21] Urban Uyghurs sometimes select Russian names for their children in cities such as Qaramay and Urumqi.^[23]

The Soviet Union supported the Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion against the Republic of China. Many of the Turkic peoples of the Ili region of Xinjiang had close cultural, political, and economic ties with the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Many were educated in the Soviet Union, and a community of Russian settlers lived in the region. As a result, many Turkic rebels fled to the Soviet Union and obtained Soviet assistance to create the Sinkiang Turkic People's Liberation Committee (STPNLC) in 1943 against Kuomintang rule during the Ili Rebellion.^[25] Ehmetjan Qasim, a pro-Soviet Uyghur who led the revolt and the Second East Turkestan Republic, was Soviet-educated, "Stalin's man" and a "communist-minded progressive".^[27]

According to her autobiography, Dragon Fighter: One Woman's Epic Struggle for Peace with China, the father of Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer served with pro-Soviet Uyghur rebels from the Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (Three-Province Rebellion) from 1944 to 1946, receiving Soviet aid to fight Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China.^[29] Kadeer and her family were close friends with White Russian exiles in Xinjiang; many Uyghurs "respected" Russians, considering Russian culture "more advanced" than their own.^[31]

Immediate causes

According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Uyghur resentment of cultural repression may explain some of the ethnic riots in Xinjiang during the People's Republic of China (PRC) period. Some Han Chinese opponents of the movement view themselves as receiving second-class treatment by PRC policies regulating ethnic autonomy.^[33]

Although Uyghur nationalist historian Turghun Almas calls the Uyghurs distinct and independent from the Chinese for 6,000 years and all non-Uyghur peoples non-indigenous immigrants to Xinjiang,^[34] the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) established military colonies (tuntian) and protectorates (duhufu 都护府) in Xinjiang in 120 BCE and the Tang Dynasty (618-907) controlled much of Xinjiang until the An Lushan rebellion.^[35] Chinese historians refute Uyghur nationalist claims, citing the 2,000-year history of Han settlement in Xinjiang, documenting indigenous Mongol, Kazakh, Uzbek, Manchu, Hui, and Xibo peoples in Xinjiang, and noting the (relatively-late) ninth-century "westward migration" of the Huigu (the PRC name for "Uyghur") people from Mongolia.^[34] The name "Uyghur" was associated with the Buddhist peoples in the Tarim Basin during the ninth century, but it had disappeared by the 15th century until its revival by the Soviet Union.^[36]

Uyghur nationalists often state that five percent of Xinjiang's 1949 population was Han and 95 percent was Uyghur, disregarding the Kazakhs, Huis, Mongols and Xibes and the fact that the Han were about one-third of Xinjiang's population in 1800 during the Qing Dynasty.^[37] Rebiya Kadeer calls Urumqi "Uyghur land".^[38] The name "Urumqi" derives from the Mongolic Oirat language. James A. Millward, a professor of Chinese and Central Asian history at Georgetown University, wrote that foreigners often think that Urumqi was originally a Uyghur city and the Chinese destroyed its character and culture; however, it was founded by Han and Hui (Tungans) and the Uyghurs are new to the city.^[39] According to Millward, the Qing agricultural colonies had nothing to do with the Uyghurs because the Qing banned Han settlement in the Tarim Basin; the state farms which were settled with 155,000 Han Chinese between 1760 and 1830 were in Dzungaria and Urumqi.^[40] Han and Hui mainly live in Dzungaria, separate from the Uyghur Tarim Basin.^[41]

At the beginning of the 19th century (40 years after the Qing reconquest), there were about 155,000 Han and Hui Chinese in northern Xinjiang and more than twice as many Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang.^[42] According to an early-19th-century Xinjiang census, the population was 30 percent Han and 60 percent Turkic. In the 1953 census the percentages were six percent Han and 75 percent Uyghur, and the 2000 census indicated 40.57 percent Han and 45.21 percent Uyghur.^[43] Stanley W. Toops said that the current demographic situation is similar to that of the early Qing period. In northern Xinjiang, the Qing settled Han, Hui, Uyghur, Xibe, and Kazakh colonists after they exterminated the region's Zunghar Oirat Mongols; one-third of Xinjiang's population were Hui and Han in the northern area, and about two-thirds were Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin.^[44] Before 1831, only a few hundred Chinese merchants lived in the southern Xinjiang oases (the Tarim Basin) and only a few Uyghurs lived in northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria).^[40] Critics have said that the government's response to Uyghur concerns do little to address the underlying issues.^[46]

Uyghur views by oasis

Uyghur views vary by oasis of residence. China has historically favored Turpan and Hami; Uyghurs in those oases (and their leaders, such as Emin Khoja) allied with the Qing against Uyghurs in Altishahr. During the Qing dynasty, China made the rulers of Turpan and Hami autonomous princes; the rest of the Uyghurs in Altishahr were ruled by beys.^[47] Uyghurs from Turpan and Hami were appointed by China as officials to govern Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin. Turpan is more economically prosperous, and sees China more positively than Kashgar. Uyghurs in Turpan are treated favourably by China with regard to religion; Kashgar and Hotan are subject to government control.^[49][51][52] Uyghur and Han Communist officials in Turpan turn a blind eye to the law, allowing Islamic education of Uyghur children.^[54][56] Religious celebrations and the Hajj are encouraged by the Chinese government for Uyghur Communist Party members, and 350 mosques were built in Turpan between 1979 and 1989.^[58] Han, Hui, and the Chinese government are viewed more positively by Uyghurs in Turpan, since the government provides better economic, religious, and political treatment for them.^[60] In 1989, there were 20,000 mosques in Xinjiang.^[62] Until separatist disturbances began in 1996, China allowed people to ignore the rule prohibiting government officials from observing religion.^[64] Large mosques have been built with Chinese government assistance in Urumqi.^[65] In southern Xinjiang China enforces its rules concerning religion, but in Urumqi the Uyghurs and religion are treated more permissively.^[66]

Restrictions

In Xinjiang, Communist Party members and civil servants who are employees of the government are not allowed to participate in religious activities; private citizens are allowed to practice religion and fast for Ramadan. Public-school students are discouraged, not banned, from participating in religious activities.^[67]

Manchu, Daur, Tartar, Tajik, Xibo, Uzbeks, Russians, Kirgiz, Hui, Mongols, Kazakhs, Han, and Uyghur are the ethnicities in Xinjiang. The Uyghur and Kazakh populations have grown; there were 1.3 million Kazakhs and 8.4 million Uyghurs in 2001, an increase from 900,000 Kazakhs and six million Uyghurs in 1982 (an increase from 500,000 Kazakhs and four million Uyghurs during the 1960s. A declining infant-mortality rate, improved medical care and a laxity in China's one-child policy helped Xinjiang's population growth.^[68] There have been attempts to restrict the Uyghur birth rate and increase the Han fertility rate in portions of Xinjiang to counteract Uyghur separatism.^[69]

There was a 1.7-percent increase in Xinjiang's Uyghur population, and a 4.4-percent increase from 1940-1982 in the Hui population. Uyghur and Hui Muslims have experienced increased tension due to Hui population growth. Uyghurs in Kashgar remember that the Hui army massacred 2,000 to 8,000 Uyghurs in the 1934 Battle of Kashgar, which caused tension as Hui moved into the city from other parts of China.^[70] Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism. Dru C. Gladney said that the Hui "don't tend to get too involved in international Islamic conflict. They don't want to be branded as radical Muslims."^[72][73] The Hui and Uyghur live separately, attending different mosques.^[74] Han and Hui intermarry more than the Hui intermarry with Uyghurs, despite a common religion; according to the Uyghurs, Hui-Uyghur frequently end in divorce.^[75] The Sibe people tend to affiliate with the Han.^[77] "Protect religion, kill the Han and destroy the Hui" (simplified Chinese: 保护宗教，杀汉灭回; traditional Chinese: 保護宗教，殺漢滅回; pinyin: Bǎohù zōngjiào, shā Hàn miè Huí) was a slogan used by Uyghur separatists during the 1930s rebellions for the First East Turkestan Republic.^[79][80]

The suppression of the Uyghurs has more to do with separatism than religion. China banned a book, Xing Fengsu (Sexual Customs), which insulted Islam and arrested its authors in 1989 after protests in Lanzhou and Beijing by Chinese Hui Muslims.^{[81][83][85][87]} The Chinese government acceded to their demands because the Hui do not have a separatist movement.^[89] Hui protestors who vandalized property during the protests against the book went unpunished, while Uyghur protestors were imprisoned.^[90]

Although religious education for children is officially forbidden by law in China, the Communist Party allows Hui Muslims to have their children educated in Islam and attend mosques; the law is enforced for Uyghurs. After secondary education, China allows Hui students to study with an imam.^[92] China does not enforce the law against children attending mosques on non-Uyghurs outside Xinjiang.^[93][94] Since the 1980s Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿學校)) have been permitted by the Chinese government in Muslim areas, excluding Xinjiang because of its separatist sentiment.^{[lower-alpha 1][96][97][98]}

Hui Muslims employed by the state, unlike Uyghurs, are allowed to fast during Ramadan. The number of Hui going on Hajj is expanding and Hui women are allowed to wear veils, but Uyghur women are discouraged from wearing them.^[99] Muslim ethnic groups in different regions are treated differently by the Chinese government with regard to religious freedom. Religious freedom exists for Hui Muslims, who can practice their religion, build mosques and have their children attend them; more controls are placed on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.^[100] Hui religious schools are allowed, and an autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader was formed with the approval of the Chinese government.^[101][102] According to The Diplomat, Uyghur religious activities are curtailed but Hui Muslims are granted widespread religious freedom; therefore, Chinese government policy is directed towards stamping out the Uyghur separatist threat.^[103]

The Uyghur separatist organization Turkistan Islamic Party magazine, Islamic Turkistan, has accused the Chinese "Muslim Brotherhood" (the Yihewani) of being responsible for the moderation of Hui Muslims.^[104][105] Among Hui and Uyghur Salafis, there is little cooperation and the Hui Salafists are politically neutral.^[106]

Hui drug dealers are accused by Uyghurs of selling heroin,^[107][108] and Hui are stereotyped as heroin dealers;^[109] they have been involved in the Golden Triangle.^[110]

According to The Economist, in 2016 Uyghurs faced difficulties travelling within Xinjiang and live in fenced-off neighbourhoods with checkpoint entrances. In southern Urumqi, each apartment door has a QR code so police can easily see photos of the dwelling's authorised residents.^[111] Doğu Türkistan Bülteni Haber Ajansı also reported on the situation in Urumqi and Xinjiang.^[112][113]

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar criticized China for restrictions on religion and Islamic teaching imposed on Uyghurs.^[114][115] The Turkish Anadolu Agency, which sent Turkish reporters into Xinjiang, reported somewhat-exaggerated restrictions and oppression; children and bearded men were allowed to enter mosques, but religious education of children is not permitted. Although government employees experience issues with fasting, private-sector Uyghurs and private citizens can fast and prayer is allowed.^[116]

Dissension among Uyghur separatists

Anwar Yusuf Turani established an East Turkistan Government in Exile.^[117] Uygher advocate Rebiya Kadeer, who now lives in the U.S., called the government in exile Chinese agents.^[38]

Timeline

Early events

The modern phase of the conflict is generally seen as beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s; Xinjiang became an autonomous region of China in 1955.^[18]

Soviet support of Uyghur uprisings

The Soviet Union supported separatist activities in Xinjiang by encouraging Kazakhs and Uyghurs to emigrate to the Soviet Union and launch attacks on Chinese territory. China responded by reinforcing the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang with Han Bingtuan militia and farmers.^[118] The Soviet Union intensified its support in 1967, doubling its Uyghur-language broadcasts; Radio Tashkent encouraged Uyghurs to revolt against the Chinese. Separatist fighters were harbored by the Soviets, and an estimated 5,000 soldiers launched attacks on China via the Sino-Soviet border in 1966.^[120][122] On 14 May 1967, the Soviet Union admitted supporting the Second East Turkestan Republic.^[124] In addition to Radio Tashkent, other Soviet media outlets directed propaganda at Uyghurs; Radio Alma-Ata and the Alma-Ata-published newspaper, Sherki Türkistan Evazi (The Voice of Eastern Turkestan), urged them to proclaim independence and revolt against China.^[126] After the 1962 Sino-Soviet split, over 60,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs emigrated from Xinjiang to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in response to Soviet propaganda promising Xinjiang independence. Uyghur exiles later threatened China with a thousands-strong Uyghur "liberation army" recruited from pro-Soviet emigres.^[127]

The Soviet Union encouraged the East Turkestan People's Revolutionary Party (ETPRP), the largest militant Uyghur separatist organization, to begin a violent uprising against China in 1968.^{[128][130][132][134]} During the 1970s, the Soviets supported the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET) to fight the Chinese.^[136]

"Bloody incidents" in 1966-67 occurred as Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along the border. The Soviets trained anti-Chinese guerillas and urged the Uyghurs to revolt, praising their "national liberation struggle".^[138] On 30 January 1967, guerilla attacks were reportedly made in Xinjiang by a "Soviet-based Turkestan refugee army".^[139] In 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along the Xinjiang-Soviet border.^{[140][141][142]}

The Soviet Union supported Uyghur separatism. According to Soviet historians, Xinjiang was the Uyghurs' native land and Uyghur nationalism was promoted by Soviet Turkology.^[143] Soviet Turkologist D.I. Tikhonov wrote pro-independence Uyghur histories; the Soviet-supported Uyghur historian Tursun Rakhimov wrote history supporting Uyghur independence and attacking the Chinese government, saying that Xinjiang was an entity created by China from East Turkestan and Dzungharia.^[145] Soviet Uyghur historians waged an "ideological war" against China, emphasizing the "national liberation movement" of Uyghurs throughout history.^[147] The Soviet Communist Party supported the publication of works praising the Second East Turkestan Republic and the Ili Rebellion.^[149] According to Soviet writers, the Uyghurs lived better lives and were able to follow their culture in Soviet Central Asia (not in Xinjiang).^[151] In 1979, Soviet KGB agent Victor Louis wrote a piece suggesting that the Soviets support a "war of liberation" against "imperial" China for Uighur, Tibetan, Mongol and Manchu independence.^[153][155] The Soviet KGB supported Uyghur separatists.^[157] Some Uyghurs viewed the Soviet Union favorably, believed that was ruled by people of Turkic origin (including Mikhail Gorbachev).^[159]

Uyghur historian Turghun Almas' book, Uyghurlar (The Uyghurs), and other Uyghur-nationalist accounts of history were "firmly grounded" in Soviet Turkology.^[160][162] According to Almas, Central Asia was "the motherland of the Uyghurs" and the "ancient, golden cradle of world culture".^[164]

In 1963, separatist Zunun Taipov was given military advice by the Soviets. The Voice of East Turkestan (Šärqiy Türkistan awazi), a newspaper promoting Uyghur separatism, was published by Yusupbäk Mukhlisi with Soviet support in 1979.^[166]

Xinjiang's importance to China increased after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to China's perception of being encircled by the Soviets.^[167] China supported the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet invasion and broadcast reports of Soviet atrocities committed on Afghan Muslims to Uyghurs to counter Soviet broadcasts to Xinjiang that Soviet Muslim minorities had a better life.^[169] Anti-Soviet Chinese radio broadcasts targeted Central Asian ethnic minorities, such as the Kazakhs.^[140] The Soviets feared disloyalty by the non-Russian Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz in the event of a Chinese invasion of Soviet Central Asia, and Russians were taunted by Central Asians: "Just wait till the Chinese get here, they'll show you what's what!"^[170] Chinese authorities viewed Han migrants in Xinjiang as vital to defense against the Soviet Union.^[171] China established camps to train the Afghan mujahideen near Kashgar and Hotan, investing hundreds of millions of dollars in small arms, rockets, mines and anti-tank weapons.^[173] During the 1980s student demonstrations and riots against police action assumed an ethnic aspect, and the April 1990 Baren Township riot has been acknowledged as a turning point.^[176]

1990s to 2001

During the 1990s, press releases alleging violent insurrections in Xinjiang and reportedly exaggerating the number of Chinese migrants and the number of Uyghurs in Xinjiang were made by Soviet-supported former United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan leader Yusupbek Mukhlisi.^[177][179] Violent attacks were carried out by Turkish-, Afghan- and Central Asian-based groups.^[181] A February 1992 Urumqi bus bombing, attributed to the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, resulted in three deaths.^[181]

A police roundup and execution of 30 suspected separatists^[182] during Ramadan resulted in large demonstrations in February 1997, characterized as riots by Chinese media^[183] and peaceful by Western media.^[184] The demonstrations culminated in the 5 February Ghulja incident, in which a People's Liberation Army (PLA) crackdown led to at least nine deaths^[185] and possibly more than 100.^[182] The 25 February Ürümqi bus bombings killed nine people and injured 68. Responsibility for the attacks was acknowledged by Uyghur exile groups.^[186][187]

In Beijing's Xidan district, a bus bomb killed two people on 7 March 1997; Uyghur separatists claimed responsibility for the attack.^[188] Uyghur participation in the bombing was dismissed by the Chinese government, and the Turkish-based Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom admitted responsibility for the attack.^[181][187] The bus bombings triggered a change in policy, with China acknowledging separatist violence.^[189] The situation in Xinjiang quieted until mid-2006, although ethnic tensions remained.^[190]

2001–2007

Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan received Uyghur recruits from the diaspora in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.^[181] The movement's goal is the takeover of Xinjiang and Central Asia.^[191] Uyghurs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and other ethnic groups flocked to serve under IMU leader Juma Namangani, who died in November 2001.^[192]

2007–2014

According to Vaughan Winterbottom, although the Turkistan Islamic Party distributes propaganda videos and its Arabic Islamic Turkistan magazine (documented by Jihadology.net and the Jamestown Foundation) the Chinese government apparently denied the party's existence; China claimed that there was no terrorist connection to its 2008 bus bombings as the TIP claimed responsibility for the attacks.^[193] In 2007, police raided a suspected TIP terrorist-training camp.^[194] The following year, an attempted suicide bombing on a China Southern Airlines flight was thwarted^[195] and the Kashgar attack resulted in the death of sixteen police officers four days before the beginning of the Beijing Olympics.^[196]

During the night of 25–26 June 2009, in the Shaoguan incident in Guangdong, two people were killed and 118 injured.^[197] The incident reportedly triggered the July 2009 Ürümqi riots; others were the September 2009 Xinjiang unrest and the 2010 Aksu bombing, after which 376 people were tried.^[198] The July 2011 Hotan attack led to the deaths of 18 civilians. Although the attackers were Uyghurs,^[199] Han and Uyghurs were victims.^[200] That year, six ethnic Uyghur men unsuccessfully attempted to hijack an aircraft heading to Ürümqi, a series of knife and bomb attacks occurred in July and the Pishan hostage crisis occurred in December.^[201]

On 28 February 2012, an attack in Yecheng killed 24 and injured 18.^[202] On 24 April 2013, clashes in Bachu occurred between a group of armed men and social workers and police near Kashgar. The violence left at least 21 people dead, including 15 police and officials.^{[203][204][205]} According to a local government official, the clashes broke out after three other officials reported that suspicious men armed with knives were hiding in a house outside Kashgar.^[206] Two months later, on 26 June, 27 people were killed in riots in Shanshan; seventeen were killed by rioters, and the other ten were alleged assailants who were shot dead by police in the township of Lukqun.^[207]

In 2014, eleven members of an organization said to be an anti-China Uighur group were killed by Kyrgyz security.^[208] They were identified as Uighurs by their appearance, and their personal effects indicated that they were separatists.^[209]

On 1 March a group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked the Kunming Railway Station, killing 31 and injuring 141.^[210] China blamed Xinjiang militants for the attack,^[211] and over 380 people were arrested in the following crackdown. A captured attacker and three others were charged on 30 June.^[212] Three of the suspects were accused of "leading and organising a terror group and intentional homicide". They did not participate in the attack, since they had been arrested two days earlier.^[213] On 12 September, a Chinese court sentenced three people to death and one to life in prison for the attack.^[214]

On 18 April, a group of 16 Chinese citizens identified as ethnic Uyghurs engaged in a shootout with Vietnamese border guards after seizing their guns when they were being detained to be returned to China. Five Uyghurs and two Vietnamese guards died in the incident. Ten of the Uyghurs were men, and the rest were women and children.^{[215][216][217][218][219]}

Twelve days later, two attackers stabbed people before detonating their suicide vests at an Ürümqi train station. Three people, including the attackers, were killed.^{[220][221][222]}

On 22 May, two suicide car bombings occurred after the occupants threw explosives from their vehicles at an Ürümqi street market. The attacks killed 43 people and injured more than 90, the deadliest attack to date in the Xinjiang conflict.^{[222][223][224]} On 5 June, China sentenced nine people to death for terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.^[225]

According to the Xinhua News Agency, on 28 July 37 civilians were killed by a gang armed with knives and axes in the towns of Elixku and Huangdi in Shache County and 59 attackers were killed by security forces. Two hundred fifteen attackers were arrested after they stormed a police station and government offices. The agency also reported that 30 police cars were damaged or destroyed and dozens of Uyghur and Han Chinese civilians were killed or injured. The Uyghur American Association said that local Uyghurs had been protesting at the time of the attack. Two days later, the moderate imam of China's largest mosque was assassinated in Kashgar after morning prayers.^[226]

On 21 September, Xinhua reported that a series of bomb blasts killed 50 people in Luntai County, southwest of the regional capital Urumqi. The dead consisted of six civilians, four police officers and 44 "rioters".^[227]

On 12 October, four Uyghurs armed with knives and explosives attacked a farmers' market in Xinjiang. According to police, 22 people died (including police officers and the attackers).^[228]

On 29 November, 15 people were killed and 14 injured in a Shache County attack. Eleven of the killed were Uyghur militants.^[229]

2015

On 18 September 2015 in Aksu, an unidentified group of knife-wielding men attacked sleeping workers at a coalmine and at least 50 people were killed.^[15] The attack reportedly "occurred when a group of knife-wielding suspects set upon security guards at the gate of the mine in Terek township before targeting the owner's residence and a dormitory for workers". The Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack in issue 19 of Islamic Turkistan, calling the perpetrators "mujahideen".^[230] On 18 November, a 56-day manhunt for the attackers reportedly concluded with Chinese security forces cornering them in a mountain hideout. Twenty-eight assailants were killed. and the group's sole survivor surrendered to authorities. The security forces forced their targets out with flamethrowers and gunned them down.^[16][231]

Anti-China protests in Turkey

On 4 July 2015, about 2,000 Grey Wolves linked to the MHP who were protesting China's fasting ban in Xinjiang mistakenly attacked South Korean tourists in Istanbul;^[232][233] China issued a travel warning to its citizens traveling to Turkey.^[234] A Uyghur employee of a Chinese restaurant was beaten by protesters.^[235] This event negatively impacted China–Turkey relations.^[236]

MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli issued a statement that the attacks were "understandable" and told the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, "What feature differentiates a Korean from a Chinese? They see that they both have slanted eyes. How can they tell the difference?"^{[237][238][239]} Another translation of his quote read, "What is the difference between a Korean and a Chinese anyway? They both have slitty eyes. Does it make any difference?"^[240][241]

Bangkok bombing and the TIP

The Bangkok bombing is suspected to have been carried out by the Grey Wolves due to Thailand's deportation of Uyghur terrorist suspects to China instead of allowing them to travel to Turkey for asylum. Adem Karadag, a Turk, was arrested by Thai police in connection with the bombing and bomb-making materials were found in his apartment. The Grey Wolves are notorious for assassinating journalists, liberals and leftists in Turkey (member Mehmet Ali Ağca's attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II) and their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechen wars.^{[242][243][244][245][246][247][248][249][250][251][252]} Due to the terrorist risk and counterfeiting of passports, Uyghur foreigners in Thailand were placed under surveillance by Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon^{[253][254][255][256]} and Thai police were placed on alert after the arrival of two Turkish Uyghurs.^[257]

Jihadism and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate were listed as part of the Turkistan Islamic Party's program,^[258] and an article attacking the U.S. and China appeared in issue 18 of the TIP's Islamic Turkistan magazine.^[259] Ahmad al Turkistani's journey to join the TIP was described in an article.^[260] The party published obituaries of members killed in action: Abdul Ghafour on May 20, 2011 and Abdul Ahad Abdul Kareem (Abdul Basit) on July 10.^[261]

The TIP used photos of Falun Gong torture reenactments, claiming that they were photos of Muslims tortured by China;^[262] Falun Gong reenacted the "Half-Flying" torture (saying that it was used in Shandong's Wangcun Labor Camp)^[263][264] Tuidang,^[265] Clearharmony,^[266] Clearwisdom^[267] and the "Sit Parallel to a Ladder" torture,^[268][269] Clearharmony^[270] saying that it was used by police in Jiamusi.^[271][272] Clearharmony^[273] Minghui^[274][275] A March 11, 2015 knife attack in Urumqi was called a "jihadi operation" by the TIP.^[276] The party praised the kidnapping of an "apostate" Uyghur who was a police officer in Hotan,^[277] a 5 May attack on a train station by "Uyghur mujahideen"^[278] and a 22 June attack by "Uyghur fidayeen" was ceelebrated by the TIP.^[279] An article on Mustafa Setmariam Nasar's career was published by the TIP.^[280] From April to August 2016, the TIP published a chart of reported casualties in the Hotan, Urumqi and Kashgar areas and the rest of China.^[281]

2016

On 30 August 2016, the Kyrgyzstan Chinese Embassy was struck by a suicide bombing by a Uighur, according to Kyrgyz news.^[282] The suicide bomber was the only fatality from the attack. The casualties included wounds suffered by Kyrgyz staff members and did not include Chinese.^[208][283] Nusra allied Syrian based Uighurs were involved in the Kyrgyzstan Chinese embassy bombing.^[284] A Kyrgyzstan government agency pointed the finger at Nusra allied Syrian based Uighurs.^[285] The embassy bombing was ordered by Sirojiddin Mukhtarov aka Abu Saloh who commands Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad in Nusra Front alongside Uighurs in Syria. Khalilova Zoira, an ethnic Uighur ETIM agent was the perpetrator of the bombing.^[286] Zoir Khalimov was also given as his name.^[287] The Syrian branch of the Turkistan Islamic Party released the video "Wake Up Oh Turkistān" (ئويغان تۈركىستان) (قوموا يا تركستان) urging Uighurs to revolt.^[288]

Jihadist elements

Al-Qaeda support for Uyghur militants

Al-Qaeda has expressed support for Uyghur militants.^{[lower-alpha 2]}</ref>^{[lower-alpha 3][lower-alpha 4]} The Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement) is allied with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,^[3] the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek i Taliban Pakistan) and al-Qaeda.^{[1][2][lower-alpha 5]}</ref>

Abdul Hameed, Abdul Azeez Makhdoom and Hakeem Makhdoom founded the Islamic Party of Turkistan (حزب الإسلام لتركستان) (Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan) in 1940.^[293] After he was freed from prison in 1979, Abdul Hakeem instructed Hasan Mahsum and other Uyghurs in fundamentalist Islam.^[295]

In 1989, Ziyauddin Yusuf (pronounced "Zeydin Yusup" in Uyghur) founded what was originally called the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) (ب الإسلام لتركستان شرقية, Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah).^[297] Its Uyghur name was شەرقىي تۈركىستان ئىسلام پارتىيىسى (Sharki Turkistan Islam Partisi),^[181] and its Turkish name was Doğu Türkistan İslam Partisi.^[299] Hasan Mahsum and Abudukadir Yapuquan reorganized the movement in 1997.^[300] In 1998 Mahsum moved ETIM's headquarters to Kabul in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Its leaders met with Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to coordinate action. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement dropped "East" from its name as it increased its domain.^[301] The group's infrastructure was crippled after the United States invaded Afghanistan and bombed al-Qaeda bases in the mountains along the border with Pakistan, during which Mahsum was killed.^[302]

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement renamed itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), although China still calls it ETIM and does not acknowledge the new name.^[193] The Turkistan Islamic Party, originally subordinate to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), split off and disseminated its Islamic Turkistan magazine and Voice of Islam media in Chinese, Arabic, Russian, and Turkish.^[303] Control of Uyghur and Uzbek militants was transferred to the Pakistani Taliban from the Afghan Taliban after 2001.^[304] TIP's Ṣawt al-Islām (Voice of Islam) media arm has released many video messages.^{[305][306][307][308]} A TIP grievance against China is the country's gender equality.^[291]

Al-Qaeda's leadership council included TIP member Abdul Haq al Turkistani,^[309] and the organization appointed TIP member Abdul Shakoor Turkistani as military commander of its forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.^[310] Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo bay have confessed that they were trained by Abdul Haq and Hassan Mahsum in Afghanistan. Haq threatened terrorist attacks on the 2008 Beijing Olympics.^[290] al-Qaeda's command viewed Abdul Haq as authoritative and sent him to meet with Taliban factions along with al-Qaeda commanders.^[311] The TIP eulogized Doku Umarov of the Caucasian Emirate.^[312][313] After Osama bin Laden's death, his successor was believed by some to be ETIM leader Abdul Shakoor Turkistani because jihadist organizations have been influenced by the ETIM.^[314]

Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a statement supporting jihad in Xinjiang against Chinese, in the Caucasus against the Russians and naming Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan as battlegrounds.^[315] Zawahiri endorsed "jihad to liberate every span of land of the Muslims that has been usurped and violated, from Kashgar to Andalusia, and from the Caucasus to Somalia and Central Africa".^[316] Uyghurs inhabit Kashgar, the city which was mentioned by Zawahiri.^[317] In another statement he said, "My mujahideen brothers in all places and of all groups ... we face aggression from America, Europe, and Russia ... so it's up to us to stand together as one from East Turkestan to Morocco".^{[318][319][320][321]}

Al-Qaeda ideologue Mustafa Setmariam Nasar wrote in support of the East Turkestan Independence Movement,^[322] Mustafa Setmariam Nasar had met some of these Uyghurs in Afghanistan where they trained as mujahidin.^[323] and its affiliated al-Fajr Media Center distributes TIP material.^[324] In 2006, the Kavkaz Center reported that al-Fajr released a video urging Muslims to wage jihad in support of the East Turkestan Independence Movement.

Al-Qaeda member Abu Yahya al-Libi spoke in support of jihad in "East Turkestan" against China,^{[325][326][327][328][329][330][331]} and Hani al-Sibai spoke in support of the East Turkestan Independence Movement.^[332] A TIP suicide bomber, Nuruddin, called for the expulsion of "Crusader" and "Buddhist" "infidels", and called "Andalusia, East Turkistan, Chechyna [and] South Africa" "lands of Islam".^[333]

As part of its outreach to foreign Muslims, in January 2009 Islamic Turkistan described ETIM as "a group of workers for Islam and the mujahideen in the Cause of Allah in order to liberate Turkistan" and said its aim was to "establish an Islamic Caliphate in the light of the Book and the Sunnah", "in the Cause of Allah, promotion of virtue, prevention of vice, and the call to Allah" and to create an Islamic state through jihad.^[334] Al-Qaeda published an article, "Did You Know? 10 Facts About East Turkistan", in its magazine Resurgence which was reportedly rife with errors.^[336]

Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria

The Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria uses the Jihadist flag with the name of the group in Arabic below the shahada:( لحزب (الإسلامي التركستاني لنصرة أهل الشام)"Turkistan Islamic Party for the Support of the People of al-Sham" (Turkish: Türkistan İslam Cemaati Şam ehlinin yardımcıları).^[337] The TIP sent the Turkistan Brigade (Arabic: كتيبة تركستاني‎‎) to participate in the Syrian Civil War,^{[338][339][340][341]} notably in the 2015 Jisr al-Shughur offensive.^{[342][343][344][345][346][347][348][349]} The TIP leader in Syria was Abu Rida al-Turkestani (أبو رضا التركستاني).^[350][351] Al-Turkestani gave a speech during the Jisr al-Shughur offensive, inviting "Muslims" from "East Turkestan" to come to Sham to "kill" "Nusayris" (Alawites).^[352] Denouncing the U.S., he said that Muslims are oppressed "in the land of Afghanistan, and in Turkestan, and in Waziristan, and in Burma, and in Bilad ash-Sham".^[353] In May 2015, al-Turkestani was killed by the Syrian army in Jisr al-Shugour.^{[354][355][356]} TIP members in Syria fight with the al-Nusra Front, since it is allied with al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and conducted suicide bombings for the front.^[357] TIP members have been killed in battle in Syria,^[356] and the party eulogized members who participated in suicide bombings and were killed in action in Jisr al Shughur.^[358] A Jabhat Al Nusra Jihadist called Abu Mohamed Al-Ansari, an al-Nusra Front member, said: "The battle was good, praise be to God. The brothers from all the groups started working together and coordinating. Each faction is responsible for a side. The majority were immigrant brothers from Turkestan. They are the ones who attacked the important points."^[359][360] Front spokesman Abu Maria al-Qahtani said that Muslims were "oppressed" in "Turkestan" and Nusra needs to "defend" them.^[361] The TIP joined the offensive on the Al-Ghab plain with al-Qaeda-affiliated Jund al-Aqsa against the Syrian army, calling the Syrian army (disparagingly) "Nusayri".^[362][363] The Turkistan Islamic Party and the al-Nusra Front launched a joint operation which overran the Syrian military's Abu Dhuhur airbase.^{[364][365][366][367]} The Turkistan Islamic Party's Islam Awazi released photos of its fighters in Syria. The Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party, the Taliban-allied Uzbek Imam Bukhari Jamaat, the al-Qaeda-allied Uzbek Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad and the Jund al-Aqsa cooperated on the Al Ghab plain to conquer crucial villages, with the TIP conducting suicide bombings in Jisr al Shughur and overrunning Abu Dhuhur with Jund al-Aqsa and al-Nusrah.^[368] The Turkistan Islamic Party released photos of their Uyghur fighters at Abu Dhuhur.^[369] A mass execution of 56 captured Syrian soldiers was carried out by the Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria with Jabhat al-Nusra at Abu al-Duhur.^{[370][371][372][373]} The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that Chechens who defected to ISIS were replaced with the Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party, allied with Al-Qaeda.^[374][375]

After the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, photos of Uyghur fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria were released with Arabic captions reading, "Standing up strongly to the Nusayri army and the Russians." (المجاهدين التركستانيين يتصدى بقوة للجيش النصيري ومن قبل الروس).^[376] In response to the Russian-backed offensive by the Syrian Army the Turkistan Islamic Party sent fighters to the Ghab Plain to support rebels against the Syrian Army, Iranians and Hezbollah forces.^{[377][378][379][380][381]} The Syria-based, Al-Qaeda linked Saudi cleric Abdullah Muhammad Al-Muhaysini arranged for foreign fighters of multiple backgrounds to repeat the phrase "The Levant is the graveyard of the Russians", in a video message, among them was a fighter claiming to be from "East Turkestan".^[382]

An al-Nusra Front fighter said that a united faction, al-Muhajireen, was formed from Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Imam Bukhari Jamaat, Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar members.^[383] Katiba Turkistan joined Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Junud al-Sham against the Syrian army in the battle for Jisr al-Shughur.^[384] Arab news agencies reported that the Uyghurs in the TIP, the Chechens in Junud al-Sham, the al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham are being coordinated by Turkish intelligence to work with the Army of Conquest.^{[385][386][387]} Syrian churches have been demolished by Turkistan Islamic Party Uyghur fighters, and in Homs and Idlib the TIP cooperated with Uzbek brigades and the al-Nusra Front; the front and ISIL compete to recruit Uyghur fighters.^[388] In Jisr al-Shughur a Church's cross had a TIP flag placed on top of it after the end of the battle.^{[389][390][391][392]} The TIP besieged the Shiite villages of Fua’a and Kafriyeh.^[393][394]

The village of Az-Zanbaqi (الزنبقي), near Jisr al-Shughur, has become a base for an estimated 3,500 Uyghur TIP militants and their families; military camps in the area are training hundreds of children. Hezbollah, Iranian and Syrian government media accused Turkish intelligence of transporting Uyghurs to Syria via Turkey to help the al-Nusra Front before sending them back to Xinjiang to fight China.^{[395][396][397][398][399][400][401][402][403][404][405][406][407][408][409][410]} Syrian political analyst and Arab nationalist Taleb Ibrahim accused Turkey of trying to demographically alter areas of Syria by sending Turkic peoples (such as Uyghurs and Turkmens) to take over villages after Arab locals are ethnically cleansed, implementing neo-Ottoman and Turkish colonialist policies.^[411][412]

The TIP's Islam Awazi encouraged Uyghur families to emigrate abroad to conduct jihad.^[413] Turkish connections were used by Uyghur fighters to enter Syria; the humanitarian Uyghur Eastern Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA, located in Turkey) sent Uyghurs into Syria, endorsed the assassination of Juma Tayir, applauded attacks in China and posted TIP content on its website.^[414] In a communique dated "Wednesday, 9th of Dhu al-Hijjah 1436 Hijra", the TIP's Islam Awazi media arm said: "This year is drawing to a close and we thank Allah for what He has blessed us with conquests, victories, and glory. We your brothers the Mujahideen of Turkistan are continuing in the liberation of the land of al-Sham and proceeding in our jihad for the sake of Allah to liberate every last inch of the land of al-Sham, with permission from Allah."^{[415][416][417][418]}

The Uyghur diaspora in the Küçükçekmece, Sefaköy and Zeytinburnu districts of Istanbul are the source of Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party jihadists in Syria.^[419][420] According to the Turkish-based Uyghur website Doğu Türkistan Bülteni (which supports the TIP), the Uyghur diaspora in Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu was fearful after the assassination of Uzbek imam Abdullah Bukhari and reports of Chinese-loyalist Uyghur agents sent to Istanbul to hunt down separatist Uyghurs.^[421][422]

ISIL support of Uyghur militants

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant released a video in June 2015 of an 80-year-old Uyghur man who came to join ISIS in Syria with his grandchildren, wife, and daughter after his son died in combat in Syria. In the video, Uyghur children sand about martyrdom and a ten-year-old threatened China: "Oh Chinese kuffar (non-believers), know that we are preparing in the land of the khilafah (caliphate) and we will come to you and raise this flag in Turkestan with the permission of Allah."^{[423][424][425][426]} The old Uyghur man said "'I made hijrah accompanied by my four grandsons, my daughter and my wife".^{[427][428][429]} Turkish passports were used by Uyghurs trying to contact Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, a pro-ISIS organization in Sulawesi.^[414]

According to the Turkish-run English-language BGNNews news agency, the Turkish newspaper Meydan reported that Uyghur fighters joining ISIL were being aided by businessman "Nurali T.", who headed a passport-counterfeiting ring in Istanbul's Zeytinburnu district. "A. G.", an informant from the ring, said: "Turkey has secret dealings with the Uighurs. The authorities first confiscate the passports but then release the individuals."^[430] After Thailand deported Uyghurs suspected to have "been on their way to Turkey, Syria or Iraq to join jihad", U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby denounced the move and said that Thailand should "allow those remaining ethnic Uyghurs to depart voluntarily to a country of their choice".^[242]

ISIS-allied Uyghurs have traveled to Indonesia to participate in terrorist attacks against Shia, Christians and the Indonesian government. During an attack in central Sulawesi, one Uyghur was killed by Indonesian security personnel in November 2015 and another was arrested for planning a second attack.^[431] The Indonesian government has contacted China for assistance in confronting Uyghur members of terrorist organizations.^[432]

In March 2016, two pro-ISIS Uighurs in Sulawesi were killed by Indonesian government forces.^[433] The Doğu Türkistan Bülteni Haber Ajansı, which supports the TIP, denounced the Indonesian government and police for killing the Doğu Endonezya Mücahitleri (Mujahidin Indonesia Timor) members.^[434][435] The Doğu Türkistan Bülteni Haber Ajansı criticized the Indonesian government for hunting down four Uyghurs who illegally entered the country to join Doğu Endonezya Mücahitleri, accusing the government of attacking Muslims.^[436][437] Two Turkish-government-issued Istanbul residence-permit application forms for ISIS fighters in Syria (Abduleziz Abdullah and Abdulrehman Memrullah) listing their nationality as "DOĞU TÜRKISTAN" (East Turkestan) were seized by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and People's Protection Units (YPG).^{[438][439][440][441][442]} According to Today's Zaman Ankara bureau chief Abdullah Bozkurt, the Islamist Erdoğan government in Turkey allowed Uyghur fighters to enter Syria via Turkey and this is impeding China-Turkey relations.^[443]

Reaction

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Organization for Freeing Eastern Turkistan and the Islamic Party of Turkistan were outlawed by Kyrgyzstan's Lenin District and Supreme Courts in November 2003.^[444] Several Uyghur fighters were shot dead by Kyrgyzstan security forces in January 2014.^{[447][448][449][450][451]} In 2006, the TIP was outlawed by Russia.^[452]

Arab countries supported China in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt helping China quash any anti-Chinese motion by the OIC concerning the Uyghurs. Egypt saw its internal sectarian problems as similar to China's, and Sudan was also concerned about external interference in its internal problems. Indonesia, dealing with its own internal Islamists, said that the disturbances in Xinjiang were ethnic rather than religious.^[453] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt helped China prevent a statement on the Xinjiang situation from the OIC.^[454] There has been no public reaction from the Arab League, Saudi Arabia and Iran on the situation, and China has improved its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia due to their influence in the Islamic world.^[455] Malaysia deported Uyghurs back to China at China's request, ignoring calls to halt the deportation.^{[456][457][458][459][460][461]} Pakistan outlawed the Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in 2013.^[4] The United Arab Emirates declared the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (Turkistan Islamic Party) a terrorist organization in 2014,^{[462][463][464][465][466]} and Kazakhstan did the same.^{[467][468][469][470]}

According to Rebiya Kadeer, Turkey is hampered in interfering with the Uyghurs because its own Kurdish issue may trigger retaliatory interference from China.^[471] An appeal for Chinese products to be boycotted by Nihat Ergun failed in 2009.^[473] Syrian ambassador to China Imad Moustapha has accused Turkey of facilitating the entry of Uighur jihadists into Syria.^[474]

Western media and human-rights organizations

In a 'New York Times interview, Nick Holdstock said that no organization is taking responsibility for attacks in Xinjiang and there is insufficient proof to blame any organization for the attacks; most "terrorism" there is "unsubstantiated", and posting Internet videos is the only thing done by the "vague and shadowy" ETIM.^[475] The United States may have an ulterior motive in trying to sabotage China with feigned concern for human rights and turning a blind eye to Al-Qaeda-allied Uyghur members of ETIM in Afghanistan by not initiating legal proceedings against Uyghur detainees in Guantanamo—instead, seeking to free them.^[476][477]

Pan-Turkish Uyghur media

Issue 14 of the TIP's Islamic Turkistan magazine endorsed attacks on Chinese workers and referred to "martyrdom operations" against a police station and a "martyr's brigade".^[478] It praised the Taliban for "humiliating" the U.S. in Afghanistan, saying that the U.S. incurred over $17 billion in "physical and military losses" and "ten thousand soldiers" dead at the hands of Arab and non-Arab mujahideen.^{[478][479][480][481]}

Islam Awazi released a video, "We Are Coming, Buddhists" (نحن قادمون أيّها البوذيون), of TIP-affiliated Rohingya cleric Abu Dhar ‘Azzam (أبو ذر عزام) (Abu Dhar al-Burmi) calling for the killing of Buddhists and Chinese: "Killing you ... Slaughtering you ... And cutting off your heads is all good"; "Kill you, spill your blood, cut off your head is a good thing"; "We are Muslims, and you are our enemies oh Buddhists and Chinese: You will not see us and killing you, and spilling your blood, and cutting your heads of: all of it is good, inshallah." ( نحن مسلمون، ولو كنتم أعداءنا أيُّها البوذيون والصينيون: لن تروا منا إلا خيرًا، وقتلكم وإسالة دمائكم، وقطع رؤوسكم: كله خير إن شاء الله.ـ) On 24 February 2014, he said: "We are a nation that loves death while you are a nation that loves wine and women, and we are coming inshallah, we want to kill Buddhists to the east of this land and to the west of it". ( إننا قوم نحب الموت كما تحبون الخمر والنساء، وإننا قادمون إن شاء الله، نحن نريد أن نقتل البوذيين في شرق الأرض وغربها.ـ); "Those Chinese Buddhists, their small eyes, flat noses. Judgment day will not come, until we attacked them. Judgment day will not come, until we slaughter them. Judgment day will not come, until our war with them and attacking them." ( وأوصيكم بأن هؤلاء الصينيين البوذيين صغار الأعين فطس الأنوف: لا تقوم الساعة حتى نقاتلهم، لا تقوم الساعة حتى نذبحهم، لا تقوم الساعة حتى نتلاحم معهم، ونقاتل ضدهم.ـ)^[482][483]

"A Message to the Turkestanis" (رسالة الى التركستانيين) featured Abdullah Al-Muhaysini, an Al-Qaeda cleric of Saudi origin.^[484][485] Muhaysini urged "Turkistani Musims" to raise their children to love death like "infidels" love life^[486] ("Turkistani" is used as an alternate ethonym for "Uyghur" by some Uyghurs).^[290][487]

The Doğu Türkistan Bülteni Haber Ajansı, which supports the TIP, cited a Reuters article which said that Uyghurs are viewed as terrorists in China,^[488][489] and criticized Islam Karimov's plan to replace a mosque with a museum^[490][491] and claimed that the AIDS virus was being used against Uyghurs.^{[492][493][494]} It praised TIP member Muhammad Ali Told Rahim, who fought in Afghanistan before he was killed in the 2011 Kashgar attacks;^[495][496] criticized a water-pipeline project from Russia to Xinjiang;^[497][498] published articles on Karimov's attempt to halt the emigration of young people from Uzbekistan.^[499] and the imprisonment of five imams by the Tajik government,^[500] and cited a Radio Free Asia report accusing a son of a former Kyrgyz prime minister of espionage.^[501][502]

Islamist Turkish publisher Beyaz Minare Kitap (White Minaret Books) published Türkistan'dan Şehadete Hicret Hikayeleri 1, by Abdullah al-Muhaysini, with biographies of (and praise for) TIP fighters.^{[503][504][505]} According to Today's Zaman Ankara bureau chief Abdullah Bozkurt, the publication of such books (including Al-Qaeda material) was part of a trend approved by the Turkish government.^{[506][507][508]}

In issue 19 of Islamic Turkistan, the TIP published an Arabic translation of the 3 January 2016 New York Times article "Xinjiang Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown",^[509][510] cited the Radio Free Asia article "Police Increase Checks of Uyghur Smartphone Users in Xinjiang",^[511][512] and presented photos of reenactments of torture methods alleged by Falun Gong as "crimes of the Chinese regime".^[513][514] Falun Gong reenacted them and claimed they were practiced by Weifang City Labor Camp.^[515] It reprinted page 818 of al-Qaeda member Atiyatallah al Libi's (عطية الله الليبي) Complete Works (كتاب الأعمال الكاملة), where he called India, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, East Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, Southern Europe and Al Andalus "occupied Muslim lands" by the "infidel's hand" and "infidel governments", identified the U.S. as the "original infidel" and called for them to be reconquered through jihad.^[516] The issue contained an interview with Abu Qatada,^[517] an article by Abi Khadeejah al-Shami on al-Qaeda member Abu Musab al Suri (Mustafa Setmariam Nasar)^[518] and Abu Qatada wrote an article on jihad.^[519] Ahrar ash-Sham member Abdurazak al Mahdi praised Sultan Satuq Bughra Khan's conversion to Islam and Qutayba bin Muslim's conquest.^[520] Al-Wathiq Billahi criticized atheism's effect on Muslim girls and praised Qutayba bin Muslim's conquest of Kashgar.^[521] Al-Qaeda member Radwan Nammous (Abu Firas al-Suri) denounced the United Nations, secularism, civility and democracy,^[522] and Tariq Abdul Haleem called Buddhists the enemy in "Turkistan".^[523] Abdullah al Muhaysini discussed the fight against the Iranians, Russians and the Syrian government.^[524] Abi Abdullah al Maghrebi attacked what he called the "Crusaders" and "filthy Rome" and the "violation" of Iraq and the Levant's "chaste sisters".^[525]

The TIP claimed that "Muslim children in Turkistan" were eaten by the Chinese, showing a faked picture of child cannibalism by Zhu Yu and photos of fake fetuses from an art exhibit.^[526] Abdullah al Muhaysini, Hani al Siba'ee, Abu Qatada and Abdurazak al Mahdi appeared in a TIP video,^[527] and the party released a video calling on Muslims to support its cause.^[528]

In the first issue of Islamic Turkistan, a Uyghur woman emigrated for jihad.^[529] The TIP praised Islamic conquests in "East Turkestan", called the Manchus kuffar (infidels) and praised Abdul Qader Damulla (عبد القادر دام الله).^[530]

Its second issue alleged that two of the "American enemy's" "spy drones" were shot down in Waziristan^[531] and discussed Uyghur TIP members at Guantanamo Bay.^[532] The TIP exulted at the international recession,^[533] denouncing the West and its ideology of democracy.^[534] Abdullah Mansur wrote an article quoting TIP leader Hassan Makhdum,^[535] and another article celebrated the Islamic conquest of Egypt.^[536] An article on Buddhism described the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and attempts by the Japanese government of "infidels" to preserve the remains of the statues.^[537]

The third issue commemorated the death of Dia al din bin Yusuf, a TIP member involved in the Baren Township riot;^[538] commemorated Uyghur TIP members who were captured and killed in battle with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud,^[539] and celebrated the conquests of Mahmud of Ghazni.^[540]

The fourth issue blued-out Hillary Clinton's face in a photo at a meeting with Barack Obama and Hu Jintao.^[541] It contained an obituary of Bilal al Turksitani, who was killed in 2000 in Afghanistan aduring the fall of the Taliban's Islamic emirate in Mazar e Sharif's Ganja fortress.^[542]

The fifth edition contained an obituary of Ibn Umar al Turkistani, who died in Afghanistan. The Uyghurs in Afghanistan fought against American bombing and the Northern Alliance after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and he died in the fighting that month.^[543] An article by al-Qaeda member Abu Yayha al Libi supported "لإurkistan".^[544]

Secularism and democracy were denounced by the TIP, which quoted from the Quran to justify its position in favor of sharia in Islamic Turkistan's sixth issue.^[545] It contained an obituary of member َQurban Ata, who was killed by American warplanes on January 17, 2010.^[546]

The seventh issue praised member Abdul Majeed (Dhabeeh Allah) as one who "loved jihad". Out of a desire for sharia, he went to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1997. In September 2003, Majeed was wounded and captured by the Pakistani army in the mountainous border region. He was deported to China and sentenced to death in 2008.^[547]

The eighth issue criticized the lack of attention received by "Turkestan" in favor of Palestine.^[548] It contained an obituary of Ruzi Muhammad (Abdul Salaam), who was killed in September 2007.^[549]

The ninth issue called Arab leaders "tyrants"^[550] and contained an obituary of TIP fighters killed in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yusuf (Idris al-Turkistani) was killed in Waziristan, and Toxti Haji (Abdul Muhsin al Turkistani) died on October 7, 2001 on Tora Bora when his training camp was bombed by American planes.^[551]

The 10th issue contained a prediction by TIP leader Abdul Shakoor Damulla that Kashgar and Hotan would be the location of military action.^[552] The 11th issue contained obituaries of Askhat bin Mahsud Dulatsheen (Abu Musa) and Al-Talib al Muhajir, TIP Uyghurs killed in Afghanistan.^[553] The 12th issue contained more obituaries. Abdul Muhsin was killed in an American bombing on March 16, 2010, Abdul Wahab was killed in July 2001 in Kunduz and Abdul Jabbar was killed by an American plane.^[554] A March 23, 2013 attack in Kashgar was called "jihad" in the 13th issue.^[555] June 26, 2013 attackers were called "mujahideen" in the 14th issue.^[556]

See also

• List of ongoing conflicts
• Uyghurs
• Terrorism in China

References

Notes

Citations

Sources

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Further reading

• Nyíri, Pál; Breidenbach, Joana (2005). China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism. Central European University Press. ISBN 978-963-7326-14-1.