James Tully (philosopher)

James Hamilton Tully (born 1946) is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Law, Indigenous Governance and Philosophy at the University of Victoria, Canada. His research and teaching comprise a public philosophy that is grounded in place (Canada) yet reaches out to the world of civic engagement with the problems of our time. He does this in ways that strive to contribute to dialogue between academics and citizens. For example, his research areas include the Canadian experience of coping with the deep diversity of multicultural and multinational citizenship; relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous people; and the emergence of citizenship of the living earth as the ground of sustainable futures.[1]

Tully is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and Emeritus Fellow of the Trudeau Foundation.[2] In May 2014, he was awarded the University of Victoria’s David H. Turpin Gold Medal for Career Achievement in Research.[3] In 2011, he received the Thousand Waves Peacemaker Award.[4] In 2010, he was awarded the prestigious Killam prize[5] in recognition of his distinguished career and exceptional contributions to Canadian scholarship and public life. Also in 2010, he was awarded the C.B. Macpherson Prize[6] by the Canadian Political Science Association for the "best book in political theory written in English or French" in Canada 2008-10 for his 2008 two-volume Public Philosophy in a New Key.

Biography

James Tully is one of the four general editors of the Cambridge University Press Ideas in Context Series. He first gained his reputation for his scholarship on the political philosophy of John Locke, and has written on constitutionalism, diversity, indigenous politics, recognition theory, multiculturalism, and the problem of imperialism. He was special advisor to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1991–1995).

Tully has held positions at McGill University, the University of Toronto, Cambridge University, Oxford University, and the University of Victoria.

After completing his BA at the University of British Columbia and PhD at Cambridge University, he taught in the departments of Philosophy and Political Science at McGill University 1977-1996. He was Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria 1996-2001. In 2001-2003 he was the inaugural Henry N.R. Jackman Distinguished Professor in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto in the departments of Philosophy and Political Science and the Faculty of Law. He returned to the University of Victoria in 2003, where he is now the Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Law, Indigenous Governance and Philosophy.

Political Philosophy

Renewing and transforming public philosophy

Tully’s approach to the study and teaching of politics is a form of historical and critical reflection on problems of political practice in the present. It is an attempt to renew and transform the tradition of public philosophy so it can effectively address the pressing political problems of our age in a genuinely democratic way. It does this by means of a dual dialogue of reciprocal and mutual learning among equals: between academics in different disciplines addressing the same problems (multidisciplinary); and between academics and citizens addressing the problems and struggles on the ground by their own ways of knowing and doing (democratic). The aim is to throw critical light on contemporary political problems by means of studies that free us to some extent from hegemonic ways of thinking and acting politically, enabling us to test their limits and to see and consider the concrete possibilities of thinking and acting differently.[7]

The politics of cultural recognition

Spirit of Haida Gwaii by Bill Reid

Tully’s 1995, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity engages with the famous indigenous sculpture Spirit of Haida Gwaii by Bill Reid as a metaphor for the kind of democratic constitutionalism that can help reconcile the competing claims of multicultural and multinational societies.[8] The ‘strange multiplicity’ of cultural diversity is embodied in the varied and assorted canoe passengers “squabbling and vying for recognition and position.”[9] There is no universal constitutional order imposed from above nor a single category of citizenship, because identities and relations change over time.[10] This view rejects the “mythic unity of the community” imagined “in liberal and nationalist constitutionalism.”[11]

Tully argues that the concept of ‘culture’ is more flexible and constructive for thinking about the rival claims of political groups than the more rigid and exclusive concept ‘nation.’[12] Culture more readily suggests that group identities are plural, overlapping, and changing over time in their encounters with others. Unlike nationalism, the politics of cultural recognition does not assume that every group aspires to its own culturally homogenous ‘nation-state.’[13] Rather, cultures must find ways to share spaces and co-exist. While they may always strive to determine their own identities and relations, pursuant to “self rule, the oldest political good in the world,”[14] the solution is not to crack down on diversity or to impose one cultural model over others.

The solution is to broaden opportunities for participation and contestation, to further democratize institutions and relations of governance, including foundational constitutions. According to Tully, “a constitution should not be seen as a fixed set of rules but, rather, as an imperfect form of accommodation of the diverse members of a political association that is always open to negotiation by the members of the association.”[15][16] No aspect of relations should be off limits to deliberation if called into question by participants affected by those relations. This is what Tully means by “democratic constitutionalism” as opposed to more conventional “constitutional democracy.”[17] From this perspective, Tully can claim that “[t]he constitution is thus one area of modern politics that has not been democratised over the last three hundred years.”[18]

For Tully, The Spirit of Haida Gwaii prefigures a more democratic, pluralistic, and just society. It evokes a simpler, more elegant, and sustainable ethos of gift-reciprocity in all our relationships, human and non-human. Getting along may be messy and imperfect business, but the passengers continue to row cooperatively, and the canoe of society glides onward.[19]

Practices of civic freedom and global citizenship

In Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume I: Democracy and Civic Freedom, and Volume II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom (2008), Tully expands his approach “to a broader range of contemporary struggles: over diverse forms of recognition, social justice, the environment and imperialism.”[20] The two volumes mark a shift toward a principal emphasis on freedom. “The primary question,” Tully writes, “is thus not recognition, identity or difference, but freedom; the freedom of the members of an open society to change the constitutional rules of mutual recognition and association from time to time as their identities change.”[21] This is “civic freedom,” referring to the capacity people have to participate in the constitution of their own governance relations.[22]

To the extent that governance relations restrict this basic freedom, “they constitute a structure of domination, the members are not self-determining, and the society is unfree."[23] Conditions of oppression, however, do not rule out or discount practices of civic freedom. Tully’s public philosophy is not concerned with ideal conditions or hoped-for peaceful futures. Rather, civic freedom exists in conduct and in relations in the “here and now,”[24] not least under conditions of oppression and conflict. Against violence and tyranny, Tully argues, practices of civic freedom make the best “strategies of confrontation,”[25] because they generate conditions for transformative change. The concluding chapter of Public Philosophy in a New Key, Vol. II examines “the democratic means to challenge and transform imperial relationships [and] brings together the three themes of the two volumes: public philosophy, practices of civic freedom and the countless ways they work together to negotiate and transform oppressive relationships.”[26]

Tully’s civics-based approach offers a new way of thinking about a diverse array of contemporary and historical traditions of democratic struggle,[27] including environmental movements[28] and indigenous struggle.[29] Tully summarizes the approach and its potential:

‘Practices of civic freedom’ comprise the vast repertoire of ways of citizens acting together on the field of governance relationships and against the oppressive and unjust dimensions of them. These range from ways of ‘acting otherwise’ within the space of governance relationships to contesting, negotiating, confronting and seeking to transform them. The general aim of these diverse civic activities is to bring oppressive and unjust governance relationships under the on-going shared authority of the citizenry subject to them; namely, to civicise and democratize them from below.[17]

From this perspective, these kinds of powerful, civic movements are not deviations or anomalies to be corrected or appeased through discipline or cooptation, but exemplars of civic freedom.[30] They disclose their positions or grievances not only through words and stated goals but through the very world they bring into being by their actions: civic “activists have to be the change that they wish to bring about.”[31] “Underlying this way of democratization,” Tully argues, “is the Gandhian premise that democracy and peace can be brought about only by democratic and peaceful means.”[32] However, this is no utopian vision, according to Tully, referring to the “thousands” and “millions of examples of civic”[33] practices everyday that make another world not only possible but “actual.”[34]

To clarify and reinforce this approach, Tully argues for an expanded conception of the term citizenship to encompass all forms of governance-related conduct, with an emphasis on “negotiated practices.”[16][35] Civic or global citizenship refers to the myriad of relations and practices (global and local) people find themselves embedded and participating in.[36] The term global draws attention to the diverse and overlapping character of governance — and hence citizen — relations.[37] Modes of civic and global citizenship “are the means by which cooperative practices of self-government can be brought into being and the means by which unjust practices of governance can be challenged, reformed and transformed by those who suffer under them.”[38]

Tully carefully distinguishes his expanded notion of citizenship (diverse, cooperative, civic, global) from the narrower but more conventional notion of citizenship, which he calls “civil citizenship” (modern, institutional, and international).[39] Where civic denotes practice and pluralism, civil citizenship singularly refers to “a status given by the institutions of the modern constitutional state in international law.”[35] This kind of (civil) citizenship is associated with the dominant tradition of liberalism, in which the state ensures a free market, a set of negative liberties (especially protections against state infringements into the private sphere), and a narrow range of participation through institutions of free speech and representative government.[40] Tully argues that this dominant module of civil citizenship is neither universal nor inevitable; rather, it is “one singular, historical form of citizenship among others.”[35] More problematically, the civil tradition often plays handmaiden to empire, insofar as imperial powers operate under international banners of ‘progress’ and ‘liberalism’:

the dominant forms of representative democracy, self-determination and democratisation promoted through international law are not alternatives to imperialism, but, rather, the means through which informal imperialism operates against the wishes of the majority of the population of the post-colonial world.[41]

By contextualizing and de-centering, or “provincializing,”[42] modern categories of “allegedly universal”[43] citizenship, Tully aims to broaden and democratize the field of citizenship and citizen practices. “This [civic and global] mode of citizenship,” he argues, “has the capacity to overcome the imperialism of the present age and bring a democratic world into being.”[44]

More recently, Tully has emphasized the importance of “coordinating” the different ways that civil (deliberative) and civic (cooperative) citizens address the same political problems, such as social and ecological justice.[45]

The transformative power of nonviolence

In the closing pages of Public Philosophy in a New Key, Vol. II, Tully explicitly links his work to the study and practice of nonviolence. He identifies four main components of Mahatma Gandhi’s life practice of Satyagraha that offer a model for approaching civic freedom and global citizenship practices: 1) noncooperation with unjust institutions, 2) a commitment to nonviolent means of resistance, 3) a focus on local, community-based modes of self-reliance and self-governance, and 4), as a precursor to these three components, “personal practices of self-awareness and self-formation.”[46] According to Tully, these cornerstones of nonviolent power “are daily practices of becoming an exemplary citizen.”[47]

Tully has since focused increasingly on the study and practice nonviolent ethics and nonviolent resistance.[48] For example, he writes,

the alternative of a politics of reasonable nonviolent cooperation and agonistics (Satyagraha) was discovered in the twentieth century by William James, Gandhi, Abdul Gaffar Khan, Einstein, Ashley Montagu, Bertrand Russell, Martin Luther King Junior, Thomas Merton, Thich Nhat Hanh, Gene Sharp, Petra Kelly, Johan Galtung and Barbara Deming. They argued that the antagonistic premise of western theories of reasonable violence is false. Nonviolent practices of cooperation, disputation and dispute resolution are more basic and prevalent than violent antagonism. This is a central feature of civic freedom.[49]

A major overlap between Tully’s civic freedom and the study of nonviolence is the shared emphasis on practice, on methods, on means rather than on ends. “For cooperative citizens,” Tully writes, “means and ends are internally related, like a seed to the full-grown plant, as Gandhi put it.”[50] This is because means “are pre-figurative or constitutive of ends. Consequently, democratic and peaceful relationships among humans are brought about by democratic and non-violent means."[51]

Tully repudiates the “depressing history”[52] of “self-defeating violent means.”[53] He rejects the idea, prevalent across the spectrum of Western political thought, from revolutionaries to reactionaries (the “reigning dogma of the left and right”[54]) that peaceful and democratic societies can be brought about by coercive and violent means. Rather, according to Tully, “the means of violence and command relationships do not bring about peace and democracy. They too are constitutive means. They bring about security dilemmas and the spiral of the command relations necessary for war preparation, arms races and more violence.”[50]

For these reasons, Tully extends his civics-based public philosophy to “practitioners and social scientists [who] are beginning to appreciate the transformative power of participatory non-violence and the futility of war in comparison.”[55]

Sustainability and Gaia citizenship

Tully’s approach to nonviolent citizenship practices includes relations with the non-human world. Tully argues that Homo Sapiens should see themselves as interdependent civic citizens of the ecological relationships in which they live and breathe and have their being. As such, they have responsibilities to care for and sustain these relationships that, in reciprocity, sustain them and all the other life forms that are interdependent on them.[56]

Tully’s "Gaia citizenship"[57] draws on earth sciences and life sciences as well as indigenous traditions. For example, pointing to the work of ecological scientists from Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and Barry Commoner to the Intergovernmental Panels on Climate Change, Tully links the unsustainability crisis of the Anthropocene to his own critique of “modern civil” modes of governmentality (as violent, exploitative, and destructive).[58] Likewise, he points to Indigenous knowledge that conceptualises human interconnectedness with the earth as gift-reciprocity relationships and as a model for social relationships.[59] The famous Indigenous artwork Spirit of Haida Gwaii remains exemplary of democratic and pluralistic ways of thinking and acting – between humans and the natural environments on which they depend.[60]

Tully’s argument is that his account of interdependent agents in relationships of governance and situated freedom can be extended with modifications to describe human situatedness in ecological relationships – as either giving rise to ‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious cycles’, depending on how we act in and on them.[61]

Selected publications

Books

Recent Articles and Chapters

Recent Public Talks

References

  1. ↑ Paraphrased from James Tully, “Faces of UVic Research: James Tully”, University of Victoria.
  2. ↑ "Bio", James Tully, Emeritus Faculty, University of Victoria. Retrieved 18 November 2014.
  3. ↑ "2014 Recipients", Craigdarroch Awards, University of Victoria. Retrieved on 18 November 2014.
  4. ↑ "Fall 2011 TW Peacemaker Awards", Thousand Waves. Retrieved on 18 November 2014.
  5. ↑ "Killam Prize awarded to people’s advocate", The Ring, University of Victoria. Retrieved on 18 November 2014.
  6. ↑ "Excerpt from the jury report: James Tully’s two-volume work argues for the democratically engaged role of public philosophy. A new, fresh and clear synthesis of his previous work on the history of Western political thought, colonialism and post-colonialism, modern constitutionalism, and indigenous peoples, Tully’s book advances an inspiring project that stresses the need for public philosophy to enter into dialogue with citizens engaged in struggles against various forms of injustice and oppression. Public philosophy can throw a critical light on the field of practices in which civic struggles take place and the practices of civic freedom available to change them. The focus upon relationships of normativity and power, and the need to bring them into the light of public scrutiny thanks to the particular academic skills available to the researchers, make public philosophy ‘in a new key’ distinctively democratic. The breadth and depth of the work, combined with Tully’s focus on civic freedom and the possibility of the reciprocal elucidation of academic work and citizens’ democratic struggles, make it a major and truly inspiring contribution to contemporary political theory," from "C.B. Macpherson Prize, 2010, James Tully" Canadian Political Science Association. Retrieved on 1 December 2014.
  7. ↑ James Tully, “Public Philosophy and civic freedom: a guide to the two volumes,” Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume I: Democracy and Civic Freedom, and Volume II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 1-11 (both volumes). For more detail, see Public Philosophy I: Part I: Approaching Practice, pp. 13-132.
  8. ↑ “The spirit of Haida Gwaii, I would now like you to imagine, can be seen as just such a constitutional dialogue, or multilogue, of mutual recognition,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1995]), p. 24.
  9. ↑ “The passengers are squabbling and vying for recognition and position each in their culturally distinct way. They are exchanging their diverse stories and claims as the chief appears to listen attentively to each, hoping to guide them to reach an agreement, without imposing a metalanguage or allowing any speaker to set the terms of the discussion. The chief’s subjection to the rule of mutual recognition is symbolised by the crests of the crew's nations and families carved in the speaker's staff,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 24.
  10. ↑ “Since recognition is never definitive, the particular constitutional arrangement of the members of the canoe is presumably not meant to be fixed once and for all. Constitutional recognition and association change over time, as the canoe progresses and the members change in various ways. A constitution is more like an endless series of contracts and agreements, reached by periodical intercultural dialogues, rather than an original contract in the distant past, an ideal speech-situation today, or a mythic unity of the community in liberal and nationalist constitutionalism,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 26.
  11. ↑ Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 26. The critique of modern, presumptively ‘universal’ conceptions of citizenship are developed in Tully, Public Philosophy I & II.
  12. ↑ “The consequence of national and liberal constitutions, which have been the dominant forms over the last three hundred years, is precisely the contemporary resistance and demands for recognition of the members whose cultures have been excluded, assimilated or exterminated. A just form of constitution must begin with the full mutual recognition of the different cultures of its citizens,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 7-8.
  13. ↑ “Although this has been the dominant form of constitutional recognition since the seventeenth century, it cannot be simply extended to the demands for cultural recognition today,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 8.
  14. ↑ Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 5.
  15. ↑ “Research,” James Tully webpage on University of Victoria website, accessed 18 November 2014; see also: “a constitution can be both the foundation of democracy and, at the same time, subject to democratic discussion and change in practice,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 29.
  16. 1 2 A major theme of Tully’s work is a careful reconceptualization or clarification of a series of contested terms, including the notions of constitution, freedom, citizenship, and the adjectives democratic, civic, and global. Tully “re-describes” each to emphasize not static categories or abstract, transcendental or universal qualities, but rather practice or praxis — dialogical relations, action, and contestation. For more on Tully’s methodological approach, drawing heavily on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Cambridge School of thought, and Michel Foucault, see Tully, Public Philosophy I, pp. 4-5, 10, 15-131, Public Philosophy II, pp. 254-256; see also David Owen, "Series Editor’s Foreword," in James Tully, On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. ix-x, Robert Nichols and Jakeet Singh, "Editors' Introduction," Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context: Dialogues with James Tully (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1-3.
  17. 1 2 Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 4.
  18. ↑ Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 28.
  19. ↑ “For all the celebration of diversity and the vying for recognition, the paddles are somehow in unison and they appear to be heading in some direction [...] This seems to imply that the kind of constitutional change required to meet the just demands for recognition can be carried out without capsizing a society,” Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 28.
  20. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 4. Tully’s work on Public Philosophy I & II “leads him to elaborate the implications of his revised view of freedom for multinational democracy and extend his analysis to encompass the history of Western imperialism,” Owen, "Series Editor’s Foreword," in On Global Citizenship, pp. xi-xii. Also, “Tully’s aim, then, is to develop alternative notions of freedom and democracy that can be woven into a non-imperial, or in fact de-imperializing, way of life,” Nichols and Singh, "Editors' Introduction," Freedom and Democracy, p. 2.
  21. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 189. And “Freedom versus domination is thus the emerging focus of politics in multinational societies at the dawn of the new millennium,” Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 190.
  22. ↑ “This is the fundamental democratic or civic freedom of citizens – having an effective say in a dialogue over the norms through which they are governed,” Public Philosophy I, p. 310. And “To be free democratically is not only to be able to participate in various ways in accordance with the principles, rules and procedures of the constitutional system, as important as this is, but also, and crucially, always to be able to take one step back, dissent and call into question the principles, rules or procedures by which one is governed and to enter into (rule-governed) deliberations over them,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 93-94.
  23. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 190
  24. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy I, pp. 20, 154, 288, Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 73, 90, 120-121, 189, 190, 229.
  25. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 280-309.
  26. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy I, p. 8; see especially Public Philosophy II, pp. 296-309, and Tully, On Global Citizenship, pp. 88-97, 305-308.
  27. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 51-53; “Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism: A view of the field from the demos,” Middle East Law and Governance, 4 (2012), 225-263.
  28. ↑ Tully, “An Ecological Ethics for the Present,” in Public Philosophy II, pp. 73-88; also pp. 70-72.
  29. ↑ Tully, “The Struggle of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom,” in Public Philosophy I, pp. 257-288
  30. ↑ “They are classified [by the dominant discourses and institutions] as acts of civil disobedience or rebellion. If these illegal struggles are successful and the extensions institutionalised, then the extensions are redescribed retrospectively as stages in the development of modern citizenship and incorporated within its framework, as in the cases of working-class struggles giving rise to social and economic rights, women gaining recognition as citizens, civil rights movements and recognition of cultural minorities. Thus, what are seen as activities of citizenship by the civic tradition – struggles for new forms of recognition and extensions of citizenship – fall outside of modern [conventional] citizenship with its institutional/status orientation,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 256, also, pp. 298, 308-309.
  31. ↑ Tully, “Two Traditions of Human Rights,” in Human Rights, Human Dignity and Cosmopolitan Ideals, ed. by Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Amos Nascimento (London: Ashgate, 2014), p. 151, also, 155, 156.
  32. ↑ Tully, “Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism," Middle East Law and Governance, 4 (2012), p. 228.
  33. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 306, 308.
  34. ↑ “Another world is actual,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 301.
  35. 1 2 3 Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 248.
  36. ↑ “From the civic perspective, citizenship comes into being whenever and wherever people who are subject to or affected by practices of governance become active co-agents within them; exercising the powers of having a say (negotiating) and having a hand (powers of self-organization and self-government) in and over the relationships that govern their interaction,” Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 272.
  37. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 243-249.
  38. ↑ Tully, On Global Citizenship, pp. 272-273.
  39. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 246-309.
  40. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 250-256; see also “Two Traditions of Human Rights,” in Human Rights, Human Dignity and Cosmopolitan Ideals, pp. 139-148.
  41. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 158.
  42. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 249.
  43. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 247.
  44. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 243.
  45. ↑ Tully, “Two ways of realizing justice and democracy: Linking Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom,” CRISPP, 16.2 (March 2013), pp. 220-233; also, Tully, On Global Citizenship, pp. 84-100, especially under “Joining hands and working together,” pp. 97-100. To illustrate, “The life of Gandhi provides an example of how these two modes of citizenship can complement each other. As a representative democrat he supported the Congress Party and representative government, and he reasoned and negotiated endlessly in the official public spheres available to him.[omitted footnote] Yet, he also grounded himself in cooperative citizenship practices of non-violent agonistics and regime change, and in alternative practices of social, economic and ecological self-government,” Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 99.
  46. ↑ “The first is active non-cooperation vis-à-vis any imperial (non-civic) relationship and its corresponding idea of one universal civilisation or cosmopolitanism for all. The second is the way of peace. For Gandhi this consists in civic organisation and uncompromising non-violent confrontation and negotiation with those responsible for imperial relationships with the aim of converting them to non-violent, democratic and peaceful relationships. Thirdly, for these two activities to be effective they have to be grounded in the local field and practices of the alternative world you want to bring about. For Gandhi this consists of ‘constructive work’ in local, self-reliant, civically organised Indian villages and respectful participation in their ways […] Fourthly, the first three practices are integrated into a singular style of civic life by the more personal practices of self-awareness and self-formation,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, pp. 308-309.
  47. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 309
  48. ↑ “Since publishing PPNK [Public Philosophy in a New Key] I have been presenting the best arguments of the antiwar and peace movements against the politics of an economy of violence and enmity and for a politics of nonviolence and compassion,” Tully, Democracy and Freedom, p. 239. See especially Tully, “Two Traditions of Human Rights,” in Human Rights, Human Dignity and Cosmopolitan Ideals, pp. 149-156; Tully, “Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism: A view of the field from the demos,” Middle East Law and Governance, 4 (2012), pp. 225-240, 250-263. “Global Disorder and Two Responses,” Journal of Intellectual History and Political Thought, 2.1 (November), pp. 49-62; Tully, On Global Citizenship, pp. 88-100, 276-319, 325-327, and Tully, Freedom and Democracy, 239-247, 264-266 (there is some overlap between these sources).
  49. ↑ Tully, Democracy and Freedom, p. 247.
  50. 1 2 Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 96.
  51. ↑ Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 96
  52. ↑ “Democratic citizens have learned from this depressing history that distrust and violence beget distrust and violence and from the history of nonviolence that there is another more powerful way that leads to peace,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 295.
  53. ↑ Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 99.
  54. ↑ Tully, Freedom and Democracy, p. 240
  55. ↑ Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 97. On the “transformative power of nonviolence,” see especially On Global Citizenship, pp. 306-308: confronting violence with nonviolence "is often considered the fundamental transformative power of non-violence since it transforms the opponents and the relationship between them from one mode of being to another. Along with constructive programmes it is at the core of Gandhi’s Satyagraha. It is called the jiu-jitsu logic of non-violence because it uses the movements and dis-equilibrium of the opponent to bring about the transformation. The non-violent actors are not only offering and suggesting a non-violent alternative in which they can combine their energy and work together rather than wasting it in futile conflict, they also manifest this alternative in their interaction and envelope the violent others in these non-violent and potentially transformative relationships. They are being peace and making peace at one and the same time. Most of the more complex and mediated techniques and strategies of non-violent agonistics are derived from and extend the bodily logic of interaction and transformation of this famous phenomenological prototype. [citing Richard Gregg's 1934 The Power of Nonviolence] The other technique that is equally important is non-cooperation. As we have seen, the civic tradition claims that unjust regimes rest not on violence or manufactured consensus but on cooperation in the sense of compliance. Therefore, the basic technique of dealing with an unjust regime from Étienne de la Boétie to the Egyptian Spring and non-violent Intifada is to withdraw cooperation in the everyday reproduction of the unjust system of cooperation," Tully, On Global Citizenship, pp. 306-307.
  56. ↑ “Civic citizens are thus ‘caretakers’ of the goods of the dwelling places in which they live. In so doing, they dissolve the modernist distinction between culture and nature that separates civics from the places in which it is enacted. Every locale and network of locales of civic activity is not only culturally diverse but also a place in the natural world with its web of relationships of biological and ecological diversity. They see the interactive and interdependent relationships between humans and nature as similar in kind to human relationships, and they attend to and care for them in similar ways. They listen and respond carefully to nature as a living being (Gaia) in their ecological sciences and daily practices of treading lightly. Civic citizens realise that this non-metaphorical field of possibilities in human/natural relationships and its limited Spielraum is the ground of all others. They are Gaia citizens,” Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 293.
  57. ↑ Tully, Public Philosophy II, p. 293; Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 93; Tully, “Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Diverse Societies,” in Trust and Distrust in Diverse Societies, ed. by Dimitrios Karmis, forthcoming; Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” forthcoming (video of talk).
  58. ↑ Tully, On Global Citizenship, p. 93; Tully, “Trust in Diverse Societies,” forthcoming; Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” forthcoming.
  59. ↑ “Just as the living earth consists of gift-reciprocity relationships that sustain the living members, so humans should relate to the living earth and each other in their social relationships in the same general way,” Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” forthcoming; and “Moreover, Indigenous peoples insist that they did not invent this system. Rather, like life and earth scientists today, they observe the gift-reciprocity relationship in the symbiotic and symbiogenetic ecological relationships of interdependency that co-sustain and co-evolve non-human forms of life, and they learn from this how human associations should relate to each other,” Tully, “Trust in Diverse Societies,” forthcoming.
  60. ↑ “The canoe is everywhere humans and non-humans dwell together. Wherever we are, we are symbiotically interdependent in the way the passengers are in the canoe. This is why we have responsibilities to respect each other and our diverse ways of living, because, as a matter of fact, they all support each other, like an old growth forest. But, in order to see this, we need to listen patiently to each other and see how the diversity looks from different perspectives, as they are doing,” Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” forthcoming.
  61. ↑ “Whether the partners generate trustful and peaceful relationships through virtuous cycles of reciprocal interaction or distrustful and aggressive relationships through vicious cycles of antagonism depends in part on whether they become aware of this interweaving of their identities in the course of their interactions or whether they hold fast to atomism: the false belief that their individual and collective identities exist prior to and independent of encounter and interaction,” Tully, “Trust in Diverse Societies,” forthcoming. And “The aim is to work together to transform unsustainable relationships into conciliatory and sustainable ones: that is, to transform a vicious social system into a virtuous social system that sustains the ways of life of all affected,” Tully, “Reconciliation Here on Earth,” forthcoming.

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