Glinski Rebellion

Glinski Rebellion
Part of Muscovite–Lithuanian Wars
DateFebruary–September 1508
LocationGrand Duchy of Lithuania
Result Government's victory
Belligerents
Glinskis and their supporters Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Commanders and leaders
Mikhail Glinski Konstanty Ostrogski
Strength
About 2,000 horsemen 15,000–16,000

The Glinski Rebellion was a revolt in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by an aristocratic group led by Prince Mikhail Glinski in 1508. It grew out of a rivalry between two factions of the Grand Duchy nobility during the last years of Grand Duke Alexander Jagiellon. The revolt started after Sigismund I, the new Grand Duke, decided to strip Glinski of his posts based on rumors spread by Jan Zabrzeziński, Glinski's personal enemy. After failing to settle the dispute in the royal court, Glinski and his supporters (mostly his relatives) rose in arms. The rebels swore their allegiance to Vasili III of Russia, who was waging a new war against Lithuania.

The rebels and their Russian supporters failed to achieve military victory. They were allowed to move to Moscow with their movable property, but their vast land possessions were confiscated.

Origin and progress

Historical background

In the early 16th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania found itself in a difficult position. The duchy lost about one third of its territory[1] as a result of the second war with Muscovy (1500–03).

In addition, there were internal disagreements over a new union with the Kingdom of Poland (1501). To take effect, the Union of Mielnik needed to be ratified by the Lithuanian Seimas. Opponents of the Union, among them Mikhail Glinski and even the Grand Duke Alexander, refused to approve the Union during the 1505 Seimas in Brest. Supporters of the union wanted to expand their own political rights; the union greatly limited the power of the monarchy and led to the elective monarchy.[2][3]

In February 1507, the Seimas in Vilnius decided to demand return of the territory lost in the previous war with Muscovy and dispatched an ambassador to Moscow with an ultimatum. The ambassador's failure was regarded as casus belli. Moscow acted first but, despite the delayed gathering of the Lithuanian troops, did not achieve any significant results. Military actions in the first phase of the war (prior to the entry of the rebels into the conflict) were rather passive and did not bring the desired result either of the parties.[1]

Causes

During the last years of Grand Duke Alexander's reign, Mikhail Glinski wielded considerable influence at the court and held the important post of Court Marshal in 1500–06. The rapid growth of Glinski's influence troubled the old Lithuanian aristocracy: the Radziwiłł family, Kęsgailos and especially Jan Zabrzeziński, who became a personal enemy of Mikhail.[4] As a trustee of the Grand Duke, Mikhail facilitated the rise of his relatives and of others, which strengthened his position.[5]

The ambassador of the German emperor Sigismund von Herberstein set out the essence of the rebellion in his Notes on Muscovite Affairs. The cause of the quarrel between Mikhail and Jan Zabrzeziński, he thought, was that former Trakai voivode Zabrzeziński ordered the beating of Glinkski's servant, when the servant was sent for the second time for oats for the royal horses in Trakai.[6] Mikhail, who had a great influence on the Grand Duke, made sure that Zabrzeziński was deprived of two posts, including the Voivodeship, even though such deprivation of posts was not common practice.[7] Herberstein reports that despite a subsequent reconciliation and the fact that Jan Zabrzeziński retained his third post, Zabrzeziński remained angry with Glinski.[8][9] According to the Polish historian Maciej Stryjkowski, who lived in the second half of the XVI century, and chronicled the middle of the XVI century in a document known as Bychowiec Chronicle, the conflict between Glinski and Zabrzeziński began after Mikhail achieved dismissal of the Lida vicegerent Yuri Ilyinich and the appointment on his place of Andrei Drozhdzh, Mikhail's cousin. Yuri Ilyinich complained that his rights violation to the Council of Lords. The Council, including its member Ian Zabrzeziński, supported Yuri and did not confirm the appointment, considering Drozhdzh as a "simple man" and recalling the enthronement privilegium of Alexander that warranted dismissal only with the deprivation of the coat of arms.[10][11][12] Alexander, angered by the disobedience, urged lords to the Brest Seimas, where ordered to imprison Ilyinich and demanded lords "not appear on his eyes".[10][11][12] Despite the chronicles description and chronology, historians note that Zabrzeziński fell out of favor due to the fact he was an active supporter of the ratification of the Union, which was thwarted on the Brest Seimas.[13] Krzysztof Pietkiewicz states that in 1503 Glinski had already accused Zabrzeziński of plotting the assassination.[14]

On August 6, 1506, Glinski triumphed over the army of the Crimean Khan under the Kletsk. On August 19 Great Duke Alexander died. On the elections Glynsky supported Sigismund, Alexander's younger brother. However under the influence of rumors, spread by Zabrzeziński, Sigismund deprived Mikhail and his brothers Ivan and Vasily their posts.[15] According to Herberstein, who called Glinski and Konstanty Ostrogski two especially famous people of the Grand Duchy,

After the king's death, the hatred which had been buried in the mind of Ivan [Jan], on account of having been deprived of his palatinate through his antagonist's influence, again awoke. The consequence was, that the latter, with his accomplices and friends, was charged with treason to King Sigismund, who had succeeded Alexander, was slandered by certain of his rivals, and declared to be a traitor to his country. The Knes Michael [Prince Mikhail], smarting under such an injury, often appealed to the king, and demanded that the cause should be equitably judged between himself and Saversinski [Zabrzeziński], declaring that he would then be able to clear himself from so heavy a charge; but finding that the king would not listen to his petition, he went over to Hungary to Vladislav, the king's brother. Thence he sent both letters and messengers to the king, imploring him to recognize his plea; but when he found that all his efforts were of no avail…

Glinski appealed for assistance to the Czech and Hungarian king Vladislav II and to the Crimean khan Mengli Giray. Vladislav II sent to the Grand Duke Sigismund ambassadors asking for Glinski "complete satisfaction". Mengli Giray sent Sigismund a message demanding to restore Mikhail on the Court Marshal post and, in the case of non-fulfilment, threatened to break the "brotherhood" (military alliance).[15]

In 1507 the Polish Chancellor Jan Laski warned Glinksi that he would never be safe because of the threat from the Lithuanian nobility. At the same time Vice-Chancellor Maciej Drzewicki argued that Laski intentionally incited Glinski to revolt. But, according to the American historian Stephen Christopher Rowell, Drzewicki always considered Laski as the cause of all unrest under Sigismund reign, believed hi was a kind of "evil genius".[16] According to Herberstein, Glinski "incensed at the indignity offered him, he told the king that he should resent such infamous conduct, and that he himself would one day live to repent it".[17][18][19]

Beginning

Glinski began to spread rumors that authorities intended to proselytize all Orthodox Christians to Catholicism and that those who refused to convert would be executed, even though Mikhail himself was a Catholic.[20] As a proof he relied on the statement of Fyodor Kolontaev, who allegedly received information from the Ivan Sapieha.[17] Later, under oath, Kolontaev denied that he said anything like this to Glinski.[21] According to Russian historian Mikhail Krom, Prince Glinski wasn't sincere in his statements. Thus in 1509, while remaining a Catholic, Glinski reported in a letter to Emperor Maximilian that he preferred not to declare his true faith until won't achieve the return of the former position and therefore he asked the emperor, the Roman Church and every Catholic for forgiveness.[20]

Taking advantage of Sigismund's departure to the Seimas in Kraków,[17] Glinski gathered his "brothers and friends"[9] and told them about his intentions. From his spies he knew that his enemy Jan Zabrzeziński was in his manor near Grodno. On February 2, 1508, Glinski and a cohort of 700 riders crossed the Neman and surrounded the manor. Then Glinski's friend German Shlyaynits broke with the people into the manor — Zabrzeziński was caught getting out of his bed and beheaded on the orders of Glinski by an unnamed Muslim.[9][17][22][23][24] It was the beginning of the rebellion.[25]

Having dealt with his main enemy, Glinski, who according to Stryjkovsky had 2000 soldiers,[26] sent units throughout Lithuania and made an attempt to conquer the Kaunas Castle. On 21 February Great Duke Sigismund sent a letter to the Crimean khan with an eye to embroil Glinski with him. The point is that Mengli Giray's greatest enemy Great Horde Khan Sheikh Ahmed was imprisoned in the Kaunas Castle and, as Sigismund states, Glinski intends to release him.[23][27] After the failure with Kaunas Castle capturing Glinski moved to Navahrudak and then went to Vilnius. But, after he had learned that the city is already prepared for the defense, we moved back to his main estate — Turov.[23]

Being in Turov, Mikhail negotiated with Great Duke Sigismund, who at that time was in Kraków, and with the Council of Lords in Vilnius. Great Duke sent to Turov his man Jan Kostevich. Kostevich handed to Glinski the grand duke's promise to resolve his conflict with the Lords.[28][29] But the Glinski family didn't trust the grand duke's envoy. They instead insisted to send to Turov one of the most influential Lithuanian noble Albertas Goštautas and stated they will wait for his arrival until March 12.[23][28]

It is not entirely clear when the Glinski family began negotiations with Moscow. According to Herberstein, Wapowski, Stryjkovsky and the Lithuanian and Samogitian Chronicle an initiative to start negotiations with the of Moscow came from the Glinski family, who even before the murder of Zabrzeziński sent a messenger with a letter to the Grand Duke. Justus Ludwik Decjusz Chronicle dates this to the time after the murder. This version is supported by the fact that Glinski's negotiations Moscow is not mentioned in the Sigismund's letter to Mengli Giray dated February 21, 1508.[30] In a letter to Vasily III Mikhail Glinski wrote, that he will take the oath to Moscow if Vasily issue a charter grands protection of his estates and property. Glinski agreed to serve with all the fortresses, which he already owns and which he will be able to take by force or persuasion.[9][17] Vasily III, who've heard a lot about the abilities of Prince,[9][22] accepted the offer and sent a "made up the best way possible"[9] agreement charter to the Glinski. Russian historian Mikhail Krom, taking into account the discrepancy between sources, dates the arrival of Mikhail's envoy to Moscow to March 1508.[23]

Russian Vremennik, a highly detailed source regarding the rebellion progress with a protograph created in the middle of the XVI century, contains a different version of the events. The unknown author points to the fact that negotiations were initiated not by Mikhail, but Vasily III himself.[29][31] This source reports about the Moscow envoy Mitya Gouba Moklokov arrival to the Glinski family with a charter of invitation to the service of Vasily III with their ancestral lands. The Glinskis brothers didn't wait for a response from Great Duke Sigismund[31] and sent their man Ivan Priezhzhy to Moscow with charters asking to take them into Moscow service and to defend them and their estates.[29][31]

Оn the Moscow service

Historical map by Viktor Temushev

After sending the envoy Glinski moved to Mazyr, where his cousin Jakub Ivashintsov served as vicegerent.[20] Probably for this reason the city was surrendered by Ivashintsov without any resistance.[28] According to Bernard Wapowski in Mazyr Mikhail Glinski was solemnly greeted by the Orthodox clergy.[20][32]

At this time the Crimean ambassador Hozyash Mirza came to the Glinski family with a proposal to move under the Mengli Giray service. Crimean ambassador promised to the princes Kiev with the surrounding lands.[28][29] Glinski rejected this offer, probably due to the fact that Moklokov already brought a response from Vasily III. The Grand Prince of Moscow took the Glinski family to the service and promised to give them all the cities that will be taken in Lithuania. He notified about the sending aid with voivodes Vasily Shemyachich, Ivan Odoevsky, Andrey and Semyon Trubetskoy, Ivan Repnya-Obolensky, Ivan Vorotynsky, Andrey Saburov, Alexander Olenka and "many other of his commanders with many people".[33] Glinski and their supporters, most of whom were their relatives or serve them,[34] took the oath (kissed the cross) to Vasily III in front of Moklokov.[31] Glinski's defection turned the nature of the rebellion from the internal Lithuanian affair to in an episode of the Lithuanian-Russian War. This was probably a good conjuncture for Vasily III who wanted to change the course of the war, because before that the war was not too well for Moscow.[31]

Information about the course of the rebellion after the Mazyr taking is fully contradictory. According to Mikhail Krom, there is a huge discrepancy between information form the earlier and from the later sources. He regards as faithful descriptions of events of spring — summer 1508 from the chronicles of Decius and Wapowski, from the Russian Vremennik and from the Sigismund's and Mikhail's letters.[35] According to these sources, the rebel units have not taken any cities except Mazyr. While in the later sources: Stryjkowski, Bielskys and Lithuanian chronicles — Glinski attributed taking Turov, Orsha, Krychaw and Gomel,[22][35][36] although it is exactly known that Turov was the originally Mikhail's possession and Gomel belonged to Moscow since 1500.[35]

According to Stryjkowski, while Mikhail tried to capture Kletsk and Gomel, his brother Vasily operated in the Kyiv region. Vasily allegedly unsuccessfully besieged Zhytomyr and Ovruch and urged the local Orthodox nobility to join the rebellion, promising that when Mikhail becomes the Grand Duke, he will revive the "Kiev monarchy".[26][37] From other sources we know only that the rebel units were in the Kyiv region. The evidence is Lev Tishkevich's appeal to the Grand Duke, issued on June 7, 1508. Tishkevich complained that Glinski had ravaged his estate near Kiev.[38]

In June 1508 the Moscow troops began to come from the different directions. On June 11 Mikhail Glinski moved from Kletsk to Minsk, whither Dmitry Zhizhemsky's detachment had been sent previously.[39] At the same time Vasily Shemyachich's troops came to Minsk from Babruysk.[33][40] The joint siege of Minsk has begun. It lasted for two weeks and ended in failure, even Mikhail wrote in his letter to Vasily III that the city garrison was "only thirty soldiers and there were… very few people in the city".[35][41] After the siege failure Glinski moved to Barysaw, where operated up to the Lithuanian troops coming.[40]

Mikhail Glinski's units operated over the large areas. They reached Vilnius and Novogrudok, where joined with the Moscow troops of voivodes Andrei Trubetskoy and Andrei Lukomsky.[40] Meanwhile, Lithuanian troops did not resist the rebels, there were only rumors that "the Lords were in Lida and moved to Novogrudok and the King [Sigismund I] allegedly… moved from Poles to Brest".[41][42]

On 12 June Prince Angrey Drozhdzh with troops was sent to Slutsk.[37][39] After the failed attempt to capture Slutsk Drozhdzh moved to Kapyl and besieged the town, but this siege was also unsuccessful. According to Stryjkowski, although this is contrary to the Mikhail's letter to Vasily III, Slutsk was besieging by Mikhail himself. Stryjkowski noted the legend that, being unmarried, Glinski intended to force the widow Princess Anastasia of Slutsk to marry him. This would give him an opportunity to claim the "Kiev monarchy" throne as Slutsk princes descended from Kievan prince Olelko Vladimirovich.[43]

One of the few rebel's successes was besieged Princes of Drutsk joining to the rebellion. From Drutsk Shemyatich's and Glinski's forces, as well as Shchenya's troops, retreated to Orsha. They fired the city from cannons, but without any harm.[33] In mid-July Lithuanian forces (15-16 thousand soldiers) under the leadership of Konstanty Ostrogski came to Orsha. Both armies stood opposite each other from 13 to 22 July, but did not dare to start the battle.[40][44] After removing the siege of Orsha Moscow troops moved to Mstsislaw, ravaged the neighborhood and then retreated to Vyazma.[40] Glinski and his supporters retreated to Starodub, belonged to the Grand Prince of Moscow.[25]

Fading and outcomes

From Starodub the Glinskis moved in Pochep, where Mikhail left his supporters and the treasury with princes Dmitry Zhizhemsky, Ivan Ozeretsky and Andrei Lukomsky, and went to the Grand Prince in Moscow.[45] In Moscow Mikhail hoped to ask Vasily III for military support.[46] Grand Prince Vasily III bestowed on Glinski Maloyaroslavets, Medyn and villages near Moscow and made other gifts. Then Vasily III let him go back to his own estates in Grand Duchy of Lithuania and sent voivove Vasily Nesvitsky "with the people along with many pischalniks"[47] in support.[45]

On returning in Mazyr Mikhail wanted to continue the struggle,[25] but on October 8 Russian-Lithuanian peace negotiations led to the signing of "perpetual peace". The peace condition was a returning to the pre-war situation and the Lithuanian recognition of Moscow gains of previous wars. Princes Glinskis and their supporters were given the right to go to Moscow with all movable property.[48] The vast land possessions of the rebels in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were subject to confiscation, although Sigismund I began to distribute them to his people back in April 1508.[49] The main Mikhail's estate — Turov — was granted to Prince Konstanty Ostrogski.[34] At the end of 1508 Mikhail Glynsky moved to Moscow, where he received Maloyaroslavets as a fiefdom and Borovsk in kormlenie ("feeding"). Medyn was granted to Ivan Glinski.[45]

According to historian Mikhail Crom the rebellion route per se shows that Glinski had no plan of warfare and rushed from one shady enterprise to another.[23] Minsk events show that Glinski had no any significant military force.[35] The main Glinski's goal — to return the high position in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania — was not achieved.[25]

Rebels

The real size of the rebel forces is unknown. Stryjkowski noted that at the beginning of the rebellion Glinskis had 2000 soldiers.[26] According to the Lithuanian and Samogitian Chronicle, they had 3000 horsemen.[22]

Historical sources contain information about 52 rebels and at least 26 of them belonged to the Glinski family, were their relatives, retainers or clients.[37][50] The 11 princes are mentioned in the Russian Vremennik among those who went with Mikhail to Moscow. 5 of them were from the Glinski family: three brothers Ivan, Vasily and Mikhail himself (sons of Lev Glinski) as well as Dmitry and Ivan Glinski. Two of these 11 were Dmitry and Vasily Zhizhemsky (Glinski's relatives). The remaining four princes were Ivan Kozlovsky (according to the source, he served to the Glinskis), Vasily Muncha, Ivan Ozeretsky and Andrei Drutsky.[37] The rest of the rebels mentioned in the Russian Vremennik were untitled persons — Mikhail's cousins Andrey Drozhdzh, Pyotr Drozhdzh and Jakub Ivashintsov, Semyon Aleksandrov with children Mikhail and Boris, Mikhail Gagin, deacon Nikolsky, brothers Pyotr and Fyodor Furs, Ivan Matov, Svyatosha, Demenya, Izmaylo Turov, Voin Yatskovich and 3 Mikhail's retainers form the Krizhin family.[29][48] According to Aleksandr Zimin, in Muscovy most of them formed a special society corporation known as "Litva dvorovaya" (Court Lithuania).[51]

Evaluation

The evaluation of the Glinski Rebellion is controversial. In scientific literature of the late 19th – early 20th centuries there is a discrepancy between different approaches to the understanding of the rebellion's essence as well as the individual facts.[52] Historians Volodymyr Antonovych,[53] Matvey Liubavsky,[54] Mykhailo Hrushevsky[55] and Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapol'skiy[56] while pointing to the rebellion's narrowness, described it as a struggle between those of "Russian" and "Lithuanian origins" in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and as an Orthodox Christian struggle against Catholic proselytism.[57] Athanasy Yarushevichru called the Rebellion as "the great disorder of the masses" and an "all-Russian affair",[58] but this evaluation received serious objections from Liubavsky.[59]

Meanwhile, Polish historians Ludwik Finkel,[60] Oskar Halecki,[61] Ludwik Kolankowski,[62] and the Russian historian Alexander Presnyakov[63] denied the ethnic and religious nature of the rebellion and considered the actions of Mikhail Glinski a shady enterprise, supported by dependent people only.[57]

In Soviet historiography the concept put forward by historian Anatoly Kuznetsov has prevailed.[64][65] In its fundamentals this concept repeats the approach proposed by Yarushevich — the Glinski rebellion is considered a "revolt of the masses", aimed at the Russian people's liberation from the authority of Catholic Lithuania.[57] Prominent Soviet historian Alexander Zimin, while an adherent of this approach, added some significant adjustments. Zimin believed that people sympathized with the idea of rebellion, but "princes did not want to use the popular movement of Belarusians and Ukrainians for reunification with Russia", and that fact led to the uprising's failure.[66] Another influential Soviet historian, Boris Florya, noted that the population not only didn't support the rebellion, but it didn't support the even the overall unifying policy of the Russian state in the 16th century. He believed this was caused by feudal lords who pursued their own interests and generally took "the anti-national position".[67]

The situation changed after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1992, Russian historian Mikhail Krom published his paper in which he completely rejected the Yarushevich-Kuznetsov concept.[68] Krom considered the Rebellion a shady enterprise,[69] caused by the desire of Mikhail and his brothers to regain the lost position. He came to the conclusion that the majority of Orthodox princes were satisfied with the situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and they did not strove to separate.[70] Mikhail Krom noted that in the early sources there are no ethnic or religious events connotation. This connotation appears only in the writings of the late 1560s-1590s, when ethnic and interconfessional differences in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania sharply worsened and the past was reinterpreted in the form of Orthodoxy-Catholicism confrontation.[20]

Any ethnic or religious underlying reason for the Rebellion is also rejected by the American historian Stephen Christopher Rowell, who pointed that Glinski supporters were limited to his relatives and clients and the Rebellion itself was a gamble in the sense that a plan did not exist and the actions had different purposes.[71] Stephen Rowell believed that Glinski was opposed, not to the monarch, whose vassal he considered himself at the beginning of the rebellion, but Zabrzeziński and his supporters directly.[71]

Polish historian Jan Tęgowski saw causes of the rebellion in the absence of family ties between the Glinski family and the state elites represented by Radziwiłł, Zabrzeziński, Kiszka and Kęsgaila. This caused disagreement between Mikhail and Jan Zabrzeziński and between Mikhail and the Council of Lords as a whole.[72]

According to Belarusian historian Makar Shnip, in the early 16th century political groupings made up on an ethnoreligious basis did not exist in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The cause of the Glinski uprising was the confrontation between Mikhail and Jan Zabrzeziński on different economic and political issues, as well as the reluctance of the Grand Duke Sigismund to resolve the case in court and his decision to strip Mikhail and his brothers of their posts. Belarusian historians consider the rebellion itself spontaneous, aimed at achieving Glinski's personal goals, with no specific sociopolitical ideas.[50]

References

Notes
  1. 1 2 Сагановіч Г. Вайна Маскоўскай дзяржавы з Вялікім княствам Літоўскім 1500-1503 // Вялікае Княства Літоўскае. Энцыклапедыя у 3 т. — Мн.: БелЭн, 2005. — Т. 1: Абаленскі — Кадэнцыя. — С. 370—371. — 684 с. — ISBN 985-11-0314-4.
  2. ↑ Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 104—105.
  3. ↑ Грыцкевіч А. Мельніцкая унія // Вялікае Княства Літоўскае. Энцыклапедыя у 3 т. — Мн.: БелЭн, 2005. — Т. 2: Кадэцкі корпус — Яцкевіч. — С. 285. — 788 с. — ISBN 985-11-0378-0.
  4. ↑ Насевіч В. Глінскія // Вялікае Княства Літоўскае. Энцыклапедыя у 3 т. — Мн.: БелЭн, 2005. — Т. 1: Абаленскі — Кадэнцыя. — С. 535-536. — 684 с. — ISBN 985-11-0314-4.
  5. ↑ Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 138.
  6. ↑ Details of the quarrel are known only from Herberstein's notes. Moreover, the German edition contains more details than the Latin. Refer to the modern scientific Russian edition: Герберштейн С. Записки о Московии. — С. 467.
  7. ↑ Насевіч В. Забярэзінскія // Вялікае Княства Літоўскае. Энцыклапедыя у 3 т. — Мн.: БелЭн, 2005. — Т. 1: Абаленскі — Кадэнцыя. — С. 638. — 684 с. — ISBN 985-11-0314-4.
  8. ↑ Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 103.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Герберштейн С. Записки о Московии. — С. 467.
  10. 1 2 Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 104.
  11. 1 2 Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rus. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 321—322.
  12. 1 2 Хроника Быховца / Под ред. Н. Н. Улащика. — М.: Наука, 1966. — С. 118—119.
  13. ↑ Wojciechowski Z. Zygmunt Stary (1506—1548). — 2-e wyd. — Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1979. — S. 77. ISBN 83-06-00105-2.
  14. ↑ Pietkiewicz K. Wielkie Кsięstwo Litewskie pod rządami Aleksandra Jagiełłończyka: Studja nad dziejami państwa i społeczeństwa na przełomie XV i XVI w. Poznań, 1995. — S. 114. ISBN 8323206201
  15. 1 2 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 141.
  16. ↑ Rowell S. C. Nolite confidere in principibus… — P. 85.
  17. 1 2 3 4 5 Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 105.
  18. ↑ Sigismund von Herberstein. Notes upon Russia / English translation by R. H. Major. — London, 1852. — Vol. 2. — P. 106.
  19. ↑ Хроника литовская и жмойтская // Полное собрание русских летописей. — М., 1975. — Т. 32. — С. 102—103.
  20. 1 2 3 4 5 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 148.
  21. ↑ Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные археографической комиссией. — Т. І (1361—1598). — СПб., 1863. — С. 35-36.
  22. 1 2 3 4 Хроника литовская и жмойтская // Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles. — М., 1975. — Т. 32. — С. 102—103.
  23. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 143.
  24. ↑ Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 345.
  25. 1 2 3 4 Грыцкевіч А. Глінскіх мяцеж 1508 // Вялікае Княства Літоўскае. Энцыклапедыя у 3 т. — Мн.: БелЭн, 2005. — Т. 1: Абаленскі — Кадэнцыя. — С. 535. — 684 с. — ISBN 985-11-0314-4.
  26. 1 2 3 Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 346.
  27. ↑ Rowell S. C. Nolite confidere in principibus… — P. 86—87.
  28. 1 2 3 4 Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 106.
  29. 1 2 3 4 5 Зимин А. А. Новое о восстании Михаила Глинского в 1508 году // Советские архивы. — № 5. — 1970. — С. 70.
  30. ↑ Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 144.
  31. 1 2 3 4 5 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 145.
  32. ↑ Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego (1480—1535) / z życiorysem i objaśnieniami J. Szujskiego // Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum. — T. 2. — Cracoviae, 1874. — S. 77.
  33. 1 2 3 Зимин А. А. Новое о восстании Михаила Глинского в 1508 году // Советские архивы. — № 5. — 1970. — С. 71.
  34. 1 2 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 150.
  35. 1 2 3 4 5 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 146.
  36. ↑ Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 347.
  37. 1 2 3 4 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 149.
  38. ↑ Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 147.
  39. 1 2 Зимин А. А. Россия на пороге нового времени. — С. 88.
  40. 1 2 3 4 5 Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 107.
  41. 1 2 Цемушаў В. Менск падчас мецяжу Міхала Глінскага // Мінск і мінчане: дзесяць стагоддзяў гісторыі (да 510-годдзя атрымання Менскам магдэбургскага права) : матэрыялы Міжнар. навук.-практ. канф., мінск, 4-5 верас. 2009 г. / рэдкал.: А. А. Каваленя [і інш.]. — Мн.: Беларуская навука, 2010. — С. 23—24.
  42. ↑ Акты, относящиеся к истории Западной России — Т. 2 (1506—1544). — 1848. — 446 с. — С. 23.
  43. ↑ Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 346—347.
  44. ↑ Зимин А. А. Россия на пороге нового времени. — С. 89.
  45. 1 2 3 Зимин А. А. Новое о восстании Михаила Глинского в 1508 году // Советские архивы. — № 5. — 1970. — С. 72.
  46. ↑ Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 108.
  47. ↑ Pischalniks were soldiers armed with pischals — shoulder firearms.
  48. 1 2 Шэйфер В. Мяцеж ці паўстанне? — С. 108.
  49. ↑ Rowell S. C. Nolite confidere in principibus… — P. 87.
  50. 1 2 Шніп М. А. Унутрыпалітычны канфлікт… — С. 4.
  51. ↑ Зимин А. А. Из истории центрального и местного управления в первой половине XVI в. // Исторический архив. — № 3. — 1960. — С. 147—150.
  52. ↑ Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 139.
  53. ↑ Антонович В. Б. Монографии по истории Западной и Юго-Западной России. — Киев, 1885. — Т. 1. — 241—244.
  54. ↑ Любавский М. К. Новый труд по внутренней истории Литовской Руси // Журнал Министерства народного просвещения. — 1898. — Июль. — С. 193—197.
  55. ↑ Грушевский М. С. История Украины-Руси. — Т. 4. — Киев-Львов, 1907. — 538 с. — С. 281—289.
  56. ↑ Довнар-Запольский М. В. История Беларуси. — М.: Директ-Медиа, 2014 (переиздание по рописи 1925 года). — 60—61.
  57. 1 2 3 Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 140.
  58. ↑ Ярушевич А. Ревнитель православия, князь Константин Иванович Острожский (1461—1530) и православная литовская Русь в его время. — Смоленск, 1897. — С. 101—105.
  59. ↑ Любавский М. К. Новый труд по внутренней истории Литовской Руси // Журнал Министерства народного просвещения. — 1898. — Июль. — С. 174—215.
  60. ↑ Finkel L. Elekcja Zygmunta I. — Kraków, 1910.
  61. ↑ Halecki O. Dzieje Unji Jagiellońskiej. — T. II. — Kraków, 1920. — S. 44—48.
  62. ↑ Kolankowski L. Polska Jagiellonów: dzieje polityczne. — Lwów, 1936. — S. 197—191.
  63. ↑ Пресняков А. Е. Лекции по русской истории Западная Русь и Литовско-Русское государство. — Т. II. — Вып. 1. — М.: Государственное социально-экономическое издательство, 1939. — 248 с. — С. 173—176.
  64. ↑ Кузнецов А. Б. К вопросу о борьбе русского государства за воссоединение западнорусских земель в начале XVI века // Труды НИИЯЛИЭ при СМ Мордовской АССР. — Вып. 27. (Серия историческая). — Саранск: Мордовское книжное издательство, 1964. — С. 26—43.
  65. ↑ Кузнецов А. Б. Внешняя политика Российского государства в первой трети XVI в. Саранск, 2002. — С. 24—29.
  66. ↑ Зимин А. А. Россия на пороге нового времени. — С. 86—90.
  67. ↑ Флоря Б. Н. Древнерусские традиции и борьба восточнославянских народов за воссоединение // Древнерусское наследие и исторические судьбы восточного славянства / В. Т. Пашуто, Б. Н. Флоря, А. Л. Хорошкевич ; Отделение истории АН СССР. — М.: Наука, 1982. — 263 с. — С. 173—175.
  68. ↑ Кром М. М. Православные князья в Великом княжестве Литовском в начале XVI века: (К вопросу о социальной базе восстания Глинских) // Отечественная история. — 1992. — № 4.
  69. ↑ Кром М. М. «Человек на всякий час» : Авантюрная карьера князя Михаила Глинского // Родина : журнал. — 1996. — № 5. — С. 45—49.
  70. ↑ Кром М. М. Меж Русью и Литвой… — С. 151—152.
  71. 1 2 Rowell S. C. Nolite confidere in principibus… — P. 87, 91—92.
  72. ↑ Tęgowski J. Ślub tajemny Jana Janowica Zabrzezińskiego. Garść uwag o powiązaniach rodzinnych elity możnowładczej na Litwie w XV i początkach XVI wieku // Średniowiecze polskie i powszechne — T. 2. — Katowice, 2002. — S. 257.
Historical sources
  • Sigismund von Herberstein. Notes upon Russia // Translated into English and edited by R. H. Major. — London: Hakluite Society, 1852. — Vol. 2. — P. 106.
    Russian scientific edition: Сигизмунд Герберштейн. Записки о Московии. В двух томах. — Том 1. Латинский и немецкий тексты, русские переводы с латинского А. И. Малеина и A. B. Назаренко, с ранненововерхненемецкого A. B. Назаренко. / Под редакцией А. Л. Хорошкевич. — Москва: Памятники исторической мысли, 2008. — С. 465-469.
  • Bychowiec Chronicle = Хроника Быховца // Полное собрание русских летописей. — М.: Наука, 1975. — Т. 32 : Хроники: Литовская и Жмойтская, и Быховца. Летописи: Баркулабовская, Аверки и Панцырного. — 235 с. — С. 172—173.
  • Lithuanian and Samogitian Chronicle = Хроника литовская и жмойтская // Полное собрание русских летописей. — М.: Наука, 1975. — Т. 32. — С. 102—103.
  • Letopis' Rachinskogo = Летопись Рачинского // Полное собрание русских летописей. — М.: Наука, 1980. — Т. 35 : Летописи белорусско-литовские. — 306 с. — С. 167—168.
  • Yevreinovskaya Letopis' = Евреиновская летопись // Полное собрание русских летописей. — М.: Наука, 1980. — Т. 35 : Летописи белорусско-литовские. — 306 с. — С. 234.
  • Russian Vremennik = Русский временник // Зимин А. А. Новое о восстании Михаила Глинского в 1508 году // Советские архивы. — № 5. — 1970. — С. 70-73.
  • Stryjkowski M. Kronika Polska, Litewska, Żmudska i wszystkiej Rusi. — Warszawa, 1846. — Т. ІІ. — S. 345.
  • Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego (1480—1535) / ed. J. Szujskiego // Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum. — T. 2. — Cracoviae, 1874.
  • Rocznik Stanislawa Naropinskiego // Monumenta Poloniae Historica / пер. с лат., комментарии А. С. Досаева (2011). — Tomus 3. — Lwow, 1878.
  • Lietuvos metrika. — Knyga Nr. 8 (1499—1514): Užrašymų knyga 8 / Parengė Algirdas Baliulis, Romualdas Firkovičius, Darius Antanavičius. — Vilnius, 1995.
References
This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 11/23/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.